Health Care Providers’ Response to Payment Incentives:  Evidence from Medicare Home Health Care. by Kim, Hyun Jee
Health Care Providers’ Response to Payment Incentives:
Evidence from Medicare Home Health Care
by
Hyun Jee Kim
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Social Work and Economics)
in The University of Michigan
2013
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Ruth E. Dunkle, Co-Chair
Professor Edward C. Norton, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Martha J. Bailey
Assistant Professor Luke Shaefer





I would like to thank all the wonderful people who helped me go through the six years
of Ph.D life.
First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my dissertation committee mem-
bers. Professor Edward Norton has been my advisor in economics since my third year. The
strong mentoring that I received from him enabled me to grow professionally and person-
ally for the last four years. He was willing to spend much time on me (I met him every
week) and I learned surprisingly many things about research from him. He helped me with
my first grant writing, first referee report, first academic paper, and first research presenta-
tion among other things. I also thank him for introducing the world of classical music to
me. He has been inviting me to the LSO concerts where he plays the horn, which was the
start of my love for classical music. Professor Ruth Dunkle has been my academic advisor
in social work since my fourth year. I am thankful to Ruth for her wonderful advice and
support throughout the graduate program. She has always been a caring, encouraging, and
understanding mentor, which also immensely helped me go through the difficult times in
Ann Arbor. I learned a lot about family caregiving from her and she broadened my perspec-
tive on this topic by sharing her expertise in gerontology and allowing me to participate in
several caregiving-related projects. I am also grateful to Professor Martha Bailey for her
critical and knowledgeable comments on my work. I greatly appreciate Professor Luke
Shaefer for his insightful feedback and willingness to help.
My friends and colleagues have been a great source of joy and support. It would have
been impossible to complete this program without Nana Lee, Keeyeun Lee, and Naeun
iii
Cho. They were my family in Ann Arbor. I thank them for being patient with me, accepting
me as I am, and being supportive all the time. I have had the greatest officemates in the
world: Susan Godlonton, Jiang Jiang, Ana Mocanu, Yunjung Kim, Caroline Weber, and
Emily Beam. I spent most of the day time with them, actually almost every day, for the
past four years. I will cherish every moment we had together, either times of laughing or
bursting into tears, in our little office. You were the best for checking on me whether I was
focusing on my work, not wasting time on the internet. Indeed, I will miss you all when I
have my own office at my new job. I should also be thankful to my friends in the Economics
Department, Laura Zimmerman, Edie Ostapik, Sophia Chen, Izumi Yokoyama, Dan Leeds,
and Hwajung Choi for the support and love they have provided so far. I particularly thank
Laura and Edie for being my wonderful job market therapists for the past year. I am grateful
to my friends in the School of Social Work, Minyoung Kwak, Sojung Park, Yoonsun Han,
Ashely Hajski, Jessuina Teran, Claudette Grinnell-Davis, Amy Krings, and Alix Gould-
Werth, for their support. I also thank my dissertation group members, Naeun Cho, Genna
Cohen, Sean Huang, and Eric Lammers, for their valuable comments and moral support
throughout my time in graduate school.
I am also thankful to Wonhyung Lee and Victor Chan for the kindness and supportive-
ness they have shown to me. One of highlights in my life in Ann Arbor was our camping
trip to UP! I also greatly appreciate Hunseok Bae and Okjoo Jung for their continuous love
and support. Both of them took great care of me during my difficult times in Ann Arbor,
and I learned what great care looks like through my interactions with them. I should also
be thankful to great friends in my bible study group, Eric Svaan, Natalie Svaan, Pauline
Banks, Jennifer Steiner, Richard Steiner, Carole Metzger, Derek Metzger, Paula Uche,
Jane Glupker, Jack Glupker, Lisa Klinkman, and Mike Klinkman.
Lastly, I am deeply grateful to my parents. They provided much love and support
throughout my time in graduate school. Without them, it would not have been possible for
me to complete the doctoral program successfully. I love their big smiles that they show
iv
me every time we videochat and respect their attitude toward to life.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. HEALTH CARE SPENDING GROWTH UNDER THE PROSPEC-
TIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE HOME
HEALTH CARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Medicare Home Health PPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Model of Agency Response to PPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1 Number of Medicare Home Health Patients . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2 Number of Episodes per Patient . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.3 Payment Amount per Episode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.4 Service Provision among New Home Health Agencies . 15
2.3.5 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.1 Number of Patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.2 Number of Episodes per Patient . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.3 Payment Amount Per Episode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.4 Service Provision among New Home Health Agencies . 23
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.1 Number of Patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.2 Number of Episodes Per Patient . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
vi
2.6.3 Payment Amount Per Episode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.4 Service Provision among New Home Health Agencies . 28
2.7 Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.7.1 Contribution of Each of the Three Factors to Spending
Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.7.2 Contribution of For-Profit Market Share Increase to Spend-
ing Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
III. MARKET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND SERVICE PROVISION
PATTERN CHANGE OVER TIME: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE
HOME HEALTH CARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.1 Incentives built in the PPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.2 Past studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.1 Influence of for-profit market share over time . . . . . . 52
3.4.2 Service provision among new home health agencies . . . 55
3.4.3 Influence of new entrants on home health service provi-
sion among existing agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.4 Learning from the practices of agencies in the same chain 57
3.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.1 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.2 Key independent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6.1 Influence of for-profit market share over time . . . . . . 60
3.6.2 Service provision among new home health agencies . . . 61
3.6.3 Influence of new entrants on home health service provi-
sion among existing agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6.4 Learning from the practices of agencies in the same chain 63
3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
IV. EFFECTS OF THE MEDICARE HOME HEALTH OUTLIER PAY-
MENT POLICY ON OLDER ADULTS WITH DIABETES . . . . . . 71
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 10 Percent Cap on Outlier Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 Expected Effects of the 10 Percent Cap on Diabetes Patients With
the Need of Insulin Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.1 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
vii
4.4.2 Change in Each Agency’s Proportion of Outlier Pay-
ments between 2008 and 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4.3 Diabetes Patients with the Need of Insulin Injection . . . 80
4.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6.1 Effect on the Number of Home Health Service Visits . . 84
4.6.2 Effect on the Types of Patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.1 Implication for Health Care Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2 Implication for Social Work Practice and Policy . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.1 Medicare Home Health Reimbursement Schedule . . . . . . . . . 100
A.2 Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.3 DFL decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.4 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104




2.1 Medicare Home Health Spending under the Different Systems . . . . . . 35
2.2 Proportion of Medicare Beneficiaries Utilizing Home Health Services . . 36
2.3 Number of Therapy Visits per Episode in 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Marginal Effects (and 95% Confidence Intervals) of Low-cost Outlier Pa-
tients (Reference Group: Non Low-cost Outlier Patients) on the Likeli-
hood of Recertification of Each Episode of Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Likelihood of Providing Any Skilled Nursing, Therapy, and Home Health
Aide Visits per Episode between 2001 and 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 PDF of the Number of Therapy Visits by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 PDF of the Number of Therapy Visits by Ownership Type . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8 Marginal Effects (and 95% Confidence Interval) of Establishment Year
(Reference Group: before 2001) on Service Provisions in 2007: For-
Profit Home Health Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1 Medicare Prospective Reimbursement Schedule in 2001 . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2 Number of Home Health Agencies, by Ownership Type: 1995-2010 . . . 66
3.3 Marginal Effects of Starting Year on Service Provision Pattern among
For-Profit Agencies in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67




2.1 Major Changes to the Medicare Home Health Reimbursement System . . 33
2.2 Factors Associated with State Variation in Price Elasticity of Home Health
Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 Contribution of the For-Profit Market Share Increase to the Total Spend-
ing Increase between 2001 and 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1 Changes in the Influence of For-Profit Home Health Agency Market Share
on Profitable Home Health Service Provision across For-Profit and Non-
Profit Agencies over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2 The Influence of Neighboring New Agencies on Home Health Service
Provision Practices among Existing Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 The Influence of Other Agencies in the Chain on Existing Individual
Agency’s Home Health Service Provision Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1 Calculation of Outlier Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 Patients with/without Diabetes and Use of Insulin in 2008: Patient’s De-
mographic Characteristics, Health Conditions, and Home Health Service
Use and Agency’s Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3 The Influence of 10 Percent Cap on the Intensity of Service Visits . . . . 91
4.4 The Influence of 10 Percent Cap on the Intensity of Service Visits by
Patient’s Level of Functional Disabiltiy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.5 The Influence of 10 Percent Cap on the Discharge Status at the End of
Each Episode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6 The Influence of 10 Percent Cap on the Discharge Status at the End of
Each Episode by Patient’s Level of Functional Disability . . . . . . . . . 94
A.1 Means and OLS regression coefficients from home health spending per
beneficiary regressions for the years 2001 and 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A.2 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition: Contribution of Each of the Three Fac-




Scholars have long debated which payment system best provides incentives to health
care providers to deliver efficient health care services. Health care providers have an incen-
tive to strategically adjust the quantity and quality of services in order to increase profits.
The recent heated debates over health care reform and cuts to government spending have
made this issue even more salient.
This dissertation addresses health care providers’ behavioral responses to incentives
built into payment systems. In particular, my dissertation focuses on the home health care
industry, and addresses how home health agencies have strategically navigated the Medi-
care reimbursement system. Examining Medicare home health care allows a unique op-
portunity to explore health care providers’ response to payment systems. That is because
home health care has undergone drastic changes in its payment system as the government
has struggled to develop a payment system that prevents home health care agencies from
providing care based on profit motives only.
Since 2001, Medicare home health care has been under the prospective payment system
(PPS). The PPS makes a pre-determined and fixed payment for each patient based on the
health condition of the patient at the admission to care. Because home health agencies
have to bear the full cost of extra treatments beyond the payment under the PPS, officials
expected this payment system to control the rising costs. Surprisingly, however, just the
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opposite occurred. Under the prospective payment scheme, Medicare home health care
spending continued to rise dramatically because of the payment incentives embedded in
the PPS (MedPAC, 2011).
Medicare home health care is also an essential research topic due to its increasingly
important role in Medicare health services. A large and growing number of Medicare ben-
eficiaries have been using home health services. The number of Medicare home health
patients increased by more than 30 percent between 2000 and 2009, and in 2009, roughly
9.4 percent of the entire Medicare beneficiary population received home health care (Med-
PAC, 2011).
Medicare home health care service also has important implications for the use of close
substitutes such as informal care and nursing home care. For example, formal home health
care can replace family or friend caregivers, who provide unpaid care for their relatives.
While this may free informal caregivers from their burdensome duties, it increases to-
tal health care expenditures. Additionally, home health care may replace more expensive
skilled nursing home care by allowing patients to receive necessary medical care at home.
This substitution is likely to save dollars. That is, Medicare home health care’s influence
on total health care spending is greater than what it seems because of its spillover effect.
This dissertation consists of three papers that examine how the Medicare home health
reimbursement system has influenced home health agencies’ service provision patterns. In
the first paper, I address this issue in the context of the unexpected increase in total Medi-
care home health spending under the prospective payment system that was introduced to
control rising home health spending. I examine the underlying forces behind the growth in
the three factors that contributed to the total spending increase: 1) the number of Medicare
home health patients, 2) the number of episodes per patient, and 3) the payment amount
per episode. Using the Medicare Claims and Provider of Services File from 1999 to 2009, I
find strong empirical support that the prospective payment system provided unintended in-
centives such that home health agencies adjusted their service provision patterns to further
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increase profits. This led to an increase in all three factors, independent of the health needs
of patients. In particular, the number of Medicare home health patients contributed the most
to the total spending increase among the three factors. In addition, many profit maximiz-
ing behaviors were most evident among for-profit home health agencies. Furthermore, the
incentives built into the prospective payment system attracted a substantial number of for-
profit agencies to the market. These new agencies pursued profitable home health provision
patterns more than agencies established prior to the prospective payment system. Overall,
the increase in the for-profit market share accounts for about one-third of the increase in
total Medicare spending between 2001 and 2009.
The second paper focuses on the interaction between for-profit and non-profit home
health agencies in a market. Building on the existing economic theory of for-profit and
non-profit behavior in competition, I propose three mechanisms that explain how behavior
changes over time. First, health care providers continue to enter the market if they perceive
opportunities for high-profit margins, and those new entrants pursue profit-seeking behav-
iors more than incumbents. Second, profit-seeking behaviors among new entrants encour-
age neighboring incumbents to resemble new entrants’ behaviors. Third, existing, chain-
affiliated health care providers learn profit-seeking behaviors from others in the chain. I
then test these three mechanisms using data on home health agencies that operated under
the Medicare prospective payment system, and find that the proposed mechanisms explain
the changes in behaviors of for-profit and non-profit home health agencies over time.
The third paper has a more narrow focus, concentrating on Medicare home health care
patients who have diabetes with long-term (or current) use of insulin. These patients are
often perceived as the most costly patients and are therefore eligible for outlier payments.
This paper examines how Medicare’s introduction of the 10 percent per-agency cap on
outlier payments affected these patients. This policy restricts total outlier payments for
each home health agency to no more than 10 percent of that agency’s total prospective
payments from Medicare each year. While the intention of this cap is to control excessively
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increasing outlier payments, it can ultimately produce undesirable incentives. In essence,
the 10 percent cap could penalize agencies that accepted and treated clinically complex,
and thus costly patients. Using the Medicare Claims and Provider of Services File from
2008 to 2010, this study finds that the 10 percent cap dramatically decreased the number
of home health service visits for diabetic patients who had the need for insulin injection.
The 10 percent cap also compelled agencies to drop the sickest patients and send them to
more costly health care settings such as nursing homes and hospitals. These findings seem
to suggest that the net effect of the 10 percent cap on total health spending is ambiguous.
Though Medicare home health care spending amounts to over 18.9 billion dollars of
government spending a year and despite the fact that over 3.3 million beneficiaries utilize
the service, it has received little scholarly attention. In addition, Medicare home health care
has significant implications on total Medicare spending because it is a close substitute of
other types of health care including informal care, nursing home care, and inpatient care. A
greater understanding of this important topic can lead to the provision of more appropriate
care at a lower cost.
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CHAPTER II
HEALTH CARE SPENDING GROWTH UNDER THE
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: EVIDENCE
FROM MEDICARE HOME HEALTH CARE
2.1 Introduction
Escalating health care spending has become a major concern in the United States over
the last few decades. One of the strategies employed by policymakers to curb this rising
spending has been to implement new payment systems. However, this sometimes results
in unintended consequences due to a supply-side moral hazard problem. The moral hazard
problem arises with the payment policy because the government cannot directly observe the
health status of patients, forcing the government to rely on health care providers to supply
appropriate levels of care. Yet, health care providers will strategically respond to payment
systems in order to increase profits, which can significantly increase health care spending
independent of the health needs of patients. Thus, policymakers must pay special attention
to the incentives embedded in the payment systems.
This study addresses this issue-how health care providers respond to financial incentives
embedded in payment systems and how that could increase health spending-in the context
of a change in the Medicare home health payment system. In October 2000, Medicare home
health care adopted the prospective payment system (PPS), which made pre-determined
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payments based on patient health status, to control the rapidly increasing Medicare home
health spending. Despite this change, total Medicare home health spending rose by 7.79
percent annually in real terms over the next nine years, which was significantly higher
than the 3.68 percent annual growth rate in the aggregate Medicare spending during the
same period (CMS, 2011). That is, Medicare failed to achieve its stated goal of controlling
costs. In particular, this study examines the growth in the three factors that contributed
to the significant increase in aggregate Medicare home health spending: 1) the number of
Medicare home health patients, 2) the number of episodes per patient (an episode is the
unit of a payment period used by Medicare home health care, which is 60 days), and 3)
the payment amount per episode. Furthermore, I examine how each home health agency’s
ownership status and establishment year affected its response to the supply-side incentives
embedded in the PPS.
Using the Medicare Claims and Provider of Services Files from 1999 to 2009, I find that
home health agencies responded to financial incentives embedded in the Medicare home
health PPS and this led to unintended increases in all three factors, independent of the health
needs of patients. In particular, among the three factors, the number of Medicare home
health patients contributed the most to the total spending increase. Relatively generous
prospective payment rates encouraged home health agencies to increase the number of
patients they treated. The PPS also allowed patients to receive home health services over
multiple renewable episodes, but provided vague guidelines about recertification decisions.
Thus, agencies could easily recertify another episode of care and increase the number of
episodes per patient to serve a profit-maximizing motive. Home health agencies also clearly
adjusted service provision practices, which increased the payment amount per episode.
For example, the non-linear pricing for therapy visits led to a predictable clumping at 10
therapy visits or more because the marginal revenue of the tenth visit, roughly 2,000 dollars,
was almost twenty times higher than the marginal cost. This dynamic caused agencies to
shift their service provision toward therapy visits and away from relatively less profitable
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services such as home health aide visits.
I also find that most of these profit-seeking behaviors (i.e.,service provision patterns that
increase a providers profit but do not necessarily correspond to a patients health needs) were
significantly more evident among for-profit home health agencies than among non-profit
agencies. Furthermore, the incentives built into the PPS continued to attract a number of
for-profit home health agencies to the market. Compared to counterpart for-profit agencies
established prior to the PPS, those new for-profit agencies that entered the market under the
PPS were more likely to pursue profitable service provision patterns. These profit-seeking
behaviors of new agencies further contributed to Medicare home health spending growth,
and partially explain why home health service provision patterns of agencies changed grad-
ually over time under the PPS. Overall, the increase in the for-profit market share under the
PPS accounts for about one-third of the increase in total Medicare spending increase be-
tween 2001 and 2009.
2.2 Medicare Home Health PPS
Medicare home health spending has fluctuated significantly under the different pay-
ment systems over the last two decades. Medicare home health greatly expanded during
the 1990s under the fee-for-service payment system. The fee-for-service payment system
reimbursed home health agencies for full costs incurred for treating patients and did not
limit the number of annual Medicare home health visits per patient (see Table 2.1 for a
brief description of each payment system). Thus, agencies had a weak incentive to provide
efficient care, which led to a significant increase in total home health expenditure under the
fee-for-service payment system (see Figure 2.1) (CMS, 2011; McKnight, 2006).
Faced with the radical growth of Medicare home health care, the government decided to
adopt the PPS. However, it took the government three years to revamp the payment system.
In the meantime, the interim payment system (IPS) was implemented on a temporary basis
with the goal of immediately curbing home health care spending (MedPAC, 2012). The
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IPS introduced an agency-specific limit on the annual per-patient payment amount and the
limit was highly restrictive. The restrictive IPS led to the bankruptcy of about 30 percent
of home health agencies in the late 1990s, and as shown in Figure 2.1, home health care
expenditures drastically dropped (CMS, 2011; MedPAC, 2010).
In 2000, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced the PPS.
Like the IPS, the PPS made predetermined payments, but the amount of payments varied
based on patient health condition. Each year, the PPS set the home health base payment rate
at the amount that would be paid per episode for an average home health patient residing
in an average market (MedPAC, 2007). The PPS also classified all Medicare home health
patients into 80 groups based on patients’ health conditions and needs at admission to care,
and assigned specific case-mix weight to each group. The PPS then determines the payment
amount per episode for each patient every 60 days based on home health base payment rate,
a patient’s case-mix weight, and each region’s wage index reflecting regional differences
in the input-price level (MedPAC, 2007). Because the payment amounts were fixed, home
health agencies had to bear the full cost of extra treatments, and thus the PPS was expected
to control rising spending.
Interestingly, although the Medicare home health payment system was termed a prospec-
tive system, the Medicare home health PPS had several important retrospective features that
caused payment amounts to vary depending on actual treatment levels. For instance, the
PPS made a significant amount of extra payments for episodes with 10 or more therapy vis-
its. It also made extra payments (known as high-cost outlier payments) in addition to the
prospective payments if each episode’s imputed treatment cost was higher than a threshold
amount for each case-mix group (HCFA, 2000). These two retrospective features encour-
aged agencies to increase the amount of care for extremely ill patients given that the fixed
payment rate under the PPS could lead agencies to avoid patients whose health care costs
were significantly higher than payment amounts. In addition, if a patient received four or
fewer visits per episode, the PPS would make a per-visit low-utilization payment by service
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type that was the same for all patients, regardless of health status. This retrospective fea-
ture saved Medicare money by making a smaller amount of payments instead of standard
prospective payments for patients who require a low number of service visits.
The main intention behind the introduction of the PPS was to curb the rising home
health spending that had occurred under the fee-for-service payment system. For this rea-
son, Medicare set the home health base rate each year such that home health spending
under the PPS stays the same as the drastically reduced level of spending under the IPS.
Surprisingly, however, just the opposite occurred. Under the prospective payment scheme,
the number of patients, the number of episodes per patient, and the payment amount per
episode increased, leading to a significant increase in Medicare home health care spending,
from $8.51 billion in 2001 to $15.46 billion in 2009 (CMS, 2011).
Despite the dramatic increase in Medicare home health spending under the PPS, no
studies have so far examined the underlying forces behind the increase in three compo-
nents of total Medicare home health spending. Instead, previous studies have examined
the implications of the PPS on other health care costs. Among those studies, Grabowski,
Afendulis, and McGuire (2011) is most relevant to this study. Grabowski and colleagues
(2011) focused on Medicare skilled nursing care that experienced a significant spending
growth under the PPS, and examined how the PPS affected the number of Medicare res-
idents in a facility, the average length of stay, and the intensity of care. They found that
skilled nursing facilities clearly adjusted service provision patterns in response to retro-
spective features built into the PPS, contributing to the growth in skilled nursing home
spending. However, their findings are potentially limited in that they used data from the
state of New York only in order to understand changes in the service provision intensity.
Given that large geographical differences in health care practice for post-acute sector ser-
vices, their findings may not be generalizable. Taking a similar approach to Grabowski
and colleagues (2011), but using nationally representative panel data across 11 years, my
study addresses how home health agencies responded to financial incentives embedded in
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the PPS and increased the number of patients, the number of episodes, and the payment
amount per episode, but in the context of Medicare home health care.
Furthermore, I examine how agencies’ ownership status, for-profit or non-profit, influ-
enced their responses to the financial incentives of the PPS. Organizational theories predict
that non-profits would be less responsive to financial incentives than for-profits for two
reasons. First, for-profit firms have to distribute profits to their shareholders and therefore
have a strong incentive to take advantage of financial incentives. In contrast, non-profit
firms have no well-defined shareholders and often have different operating goals such as
maximizing the quantity and quality of services (Sloan, 2000). Second, employees in non-
profits tended to be more altruistic decision-makers and thus would be less responsive to
financial incentives (Duggan, 2000).
Previous studies empirically examined this issue, and their results were mixed. Dafny
(2005) examined how hospitals upcoded Medicare patients to more profitable diagnosis
codes. She found that this upcoding practice was particularly intense among for-profit
hospitals. In contrast, Duggan (2000) found that non-profit hospitals were responsive to
financial incentives as much as for-profits were. He examined how much for-profit and
non-profit hospitals increased the proportion of poor patients in response to the public
program that financially supported hospitals serving a disproportionately high fraction of
low-income patients. He found that for-profits’ behaviors were not different from non-
profits. In the same vein, this study also examines how for-profit and non-profit health care
providers differently responded to financial incentives, but in the context of the home health
care industry.
2.3 Model of Agency Response to PPS
Changes in demographics and substitutable health services have affected demand for
home health services to a certain degree. However, the demand for home health services
has not been influenced by price shocks created by the PPS because Medicare home health
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services are free to all patients. For this reason, this paper focuses on the supply-side
response to the PPS, not the demand-side response.
In this section, I present conceptual models that explain how agencies responded to fi-
nancial incentives embedded in the PPS. The models show how agencies adjusted their de-
cisions about the number of patients to treat (the extensive margin), the number of episodes
of care per patient, and the number of service visits per episode to provide (the intensive
margin). Finally, I illustrate how new agencies that entered the market under the PPS made
different decisions on the intensive margin from existing agencies.
2.3.1 Number of Medicare Home Health Patients
This section illustrates how agencies increased the proportion of Medicare beneficia-
ries utilizing home health service under the PPS. Specifically, I show that for-profit agency
market share in each state was positively associated with the state’s price elasticity of home
health supply. That is, during the transition from IPS to PPS, the proportion of home health
patients increased to a greater degree in states with more for-profit agencies and fewer
non-profit agencies. (The PPS drove payment rates higher than they had been under the
IPS by adding new features, including case-mix adjustments and the provision of the extra
payments for intensive treatments.) This suggests that agencies increased the proportion
of home health patients to increase profits under relatively generous prospective payment
rates, given the assumption that for-profit agencies are more likely to prioritize profit in-
crease than non-profits.
There has been large state variation in for-profit home health agency market share. Cer-
tain states have had a more business-friendly environment, for example, low state corporate
tax rates or more lenient regulations (e.g. no certificate of need (CON) program for home
health agencies), and thus have attracted more for-profit agencies. For example, in the state
of Texas, which had relatively low corporate tax rates and no CON, 81.94 and 93.35 percent
of the agencies were for-profit in 2000 and 2009. In contrast, New Jersey with relatively
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high corporate tax rates and CON had 14.81 and 23.53 percent of for-profit agencies in the
corresponding years.
The state variation in for-profit market share results in differences in the slopes of the
state-level market supply curves. To explain this, I first start with a for-profit and non-profit
agency’s short-run supply curve. A for-profit agency has a more elastic supply curve be-
cause for-profit agencies tend to be more responsive to changes in government reimburse-
ment rates (FitzGerald et al., 2006; Sloan, 2000) (see Figure 2.2 (a)). Therefore, states with
a higher for-profit market share end up having a flatter market supply curve. That is, the
market supply curve in Texas is more elastic than that in New Jersey (see Figure 2.2 (b)).
I assume that 1) the demand curve for home health service is completely inelastic with
respect to payment rates because Medicare does not require home health patients to make
any payments, and 2) there is always excess demand for home health care. The generous
prospective payment rates enabled agencies to make positive profit margins which attracted
new agencies to the market (MedPAC, 2011). In particular, states with a higher for-profit
market share experienced more entries of new agencies due to their business-friendly en-
vironment. Thus, the market supply curve in Texas shifted to the right to a greater degree
(see Figure 2.2 (c)).
2.3.2 Number of Episodes per Patient
Another factor that contributed to the total spending increase was the increase in the
number of episodes per patient. The PPS allowed patients to receive services over an un-
limited number of renewable episodes as long as agencies obtained a physician’s permis-
sion for the recertification of an additional episode of care. However, there were only vague
guidelines about recertification decisions (i.e., a patient had to be home-bound and in need
of skilled care) and physicians relied on information provided by agencies in making these
decisions (Henkemeyer, 2012; MedPAC, 2012). Thus, home health agencies could easily
increase the number of episodes for each patient. This tendency might have been stronger
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for relatively profitable patients because agencies found it more profitable to recertify less
costly patients, given their limited resources. This tendency might be also stronger among
for-profit agencies.
2.3.3 Payment Amount per Episode
The PPS also affected agency decisions about the type and number of service visits to
provide, thereby increasing the payment amount per episode.
2.3.3.1 Types of Service Visits
A home health agency adjusts which type of services to provide(skilled nursing visits,
therapy visits, or home health aide visits), considering each service’s profitability and effect
on patient health.
The agency has a strong incentive to provide therapy visits for an increasing number
of episodes if the agency foresees the opportunity to provide 10 or more therapy visits
because the marginal benefit of the 10th therapy visit is high. Therapy visits can also
have a significant influence on patient health. By contrast, home health aide visits are not
compensated for the extra number of visits. In addition, agencies do not perceive home
health aide services, which involve non-medical assistance related to eating, dressing, and
bathing, as directly relevant to patient health status. Agencies thus have a strong incentive
to refrain from providing home health aide visits as they seek to maximize profits. Skilled
nursing visits are also uncompensated for extra visits, but can have a significant effect
on patient health. Therefore, agencies have only a moderate level of incentive to provide
skilled nursing visits. For-profit agencies may be more likely to provide therapy visits and
less likely to provide home health aide visits, because of these services’ profitability and
effect on patient health.
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2.3.3.2 Number of Service Visits
In this section, I explain how agencies adjust the number of service visits under the
PPS, using a graphical illustration of an agency’s optimal choice regarding the number of
home health service visits per episode (Ellis & McGuire, 1986). For simplicity, I make
several assumptions in this illustration. First, a patient receives therapy visits only, but
an agency’s optimal therapy visits derived from this model should also work for a patient
who receives therapy visits along with other types of home health services. An agency
chooses the optimal number of therapy visits for a single patient, without consideration of
the patient composition (in terms of their severity of illness) within the agency. In addition,
a home health agency cares about both its profits and patient health status at the end of an
episode of care in its utility.
My graphical illustration of an agency’s decision starts with a Medicare home health
reimbursement schedule for a patient who received therapy visits only. As discussed above,
the Medicare home health PPS had retrospective features and thus the reimbursement
amount per episode changed as the number of therapy visits increased (see Figure 2.3 (a)).
Refer to Appendix A.1 for a more detailed explanation about how the reimbursement sched-
ule was determined.
The agency’s profits per episode also changed as the number of therapy visits increased
(see Figure 2.3 (b)). The profit curves slope down more because the cost of one therapy
visit was $105 and I subtract $105×V T from Medicare reimbursement amounts (HCFA,
2000).
Next, I add the agency’s indifference curve, which is convex to the origin because the
agency cares about both its profit and patient health status at the end of an episode of care
(which is a positive linear function of the number of therapy visits) (see Figure 2.3 (c)). The
agency chooses the number of therapy visits that maximizes its utility given its profit func-
tion. Therefore, the agency chooses to provide a number of therapy visits that corresponds
to point E, the equilibrium point.
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The profit incentives built into the reimbursement system encourages the agency to
provide a certain number of therapy visits. For example, the agency enjoys a higher level of
utility when it provides 5 therapy visits rather than 4, and 10 visits rather than 9, regardless
of its preference for profit relative to patient health status (see Figure 2.3 (d)).
For-profit and non-profit agencies make different decisions in terms of the number of
therapy visits per episode provided. If a for-profit agency prioritizes profit more than a non-
profit agency does, then the for-profit agency has a flatter indifference curve. Therefore, a
for-profit agency provides fewer service visits (closer to 10 and closer to 5) than a non-profit
agency does (see Figure 2.3 (e)).
2.3.4 Service Provision among New Home Health Agencies
Many home health agencies, mostly for-profits (95.73 percent), entered the market un-
der the PPS. New agencies might adopt profitable service provision patterns (i.e., a higher
likelihood of recertifying another episode of care and adjusting the number of service visits
to increase the payment amount per episode) more than existing agencies established prior
to the PPS. I suggest two explanations for this phenomenon. First, new agencies might have
entered the home health market under the PPS because they knew the PPS would enable
them to achieve high profit margins. Thus, new entrants would become more engaged with
profit-seeking behaviors. Second, existing home health agencies might have more stable
budget sources (Choi & Davitt, 2009) given that they survived the restrictive payment rates
under the IPS. Therefore, financial incentives built into the PPS might be less attractive to
existing agencies than to new ones.
Given that many agencies continued to enter the market under the PPS, if new agencies
pursued profitable service provisions more than did existing agencies, the entry of new
agencies would make a significant contribution to Medicare home health spending growth.
In addition, profit-seeking behaviors among new agencies may partially explain why home
health service provision patterns changed gradually over time under the PPS.
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2.3.5 Hypotheses
The conceptual framework leads to four testable hypotheses. First, agencies increased
the proportion of home health patients to increase profits. Second, agencies treated their
patients for a higher number of episodes of care to increase profits, and this tendency was
stronger among for-profit agencies. Third, agencies adjusted the types and number of ser-
vice visits, which increased the payment amount per episode, and the degree of the adjust-
ment was greater among for-profit agencies. Fourth, agencies that entered the market under
the PPS, mostly for-profits, were more likely to pursue profitable service provision patterns
than existing agencies.
2.4 Data
This study uses data from: 1) the CMS 5% Limited Data Set-Denominator File from
1999 to 2009, 2) the CMS 5% Limited Data Set-Home Health Agency File from 1999
to 2009, 3) the CMS Provider of Services File-Home Health Agency from 1999 to 2009,
and 4) the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series-Current Population Survey (IPUM-CPS)
from 1994, and 1999 to 2009 (King et al., 2010). The first dataset, which was extracted
from Medicare claims, is a panel of 5 percent of Medicare beneficiaries and contains basic
demographic information such as age, race, gender, and date of death, as well as Medi-
care HMO enrollment status. The second dataset, which was also taken from Medicare
claims, is also a panel of 5 percent of Medicare home health patients and contains admin-
istrative information about each patient’s Medicare home health care service use (CMS,
2012). The third dataset was extracted from the Online Survey and Certification Reporting
System/Quality Improvement Evaluation System collected by the CMS Regional Offices
(Choi & Davitt, 2009; CMS, 2012). It is a panel of all Medicare/Medicaid-certified home
health agencies across the nation and includes their basic agency information such as loca-
tion, ownership type, and initial date of Medicare certification. The last dataset, extracted
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from the Current Population Survey, contains sampled individuals’ basic demographic in-
formation not available in the CMS 5% Limited Data Set-Denominator File, such as marital
status, residence with any child, and living below poverty lines each year.
I combine the first two datasets using each beneficiary’s ID number, and create a com-
plete Medicare claim dataset. The home health agency provider number enables me to
merge the combined Medicare claim dataset and the CMS Provider of Services File, result-
ing in a patient-agency linked, unbalanced panel data set. Each observation in this dataset
corresponds to a patient’s unique episode of care. I use the merged dataset for my analysis
of the number of episodes per patient and the payment amount per episode. For my analysis
of the number of patients, I use both a dataset of patient-episode level data and IPUM-CPS
data.
I limit my sample to Medicare beneficiaries who were 65 or older. I drop beneficia-
ries who were enrolled in Medicare HMOs because Medicare HMOs were not directly
influenced by Medicare reimbursement system changes. In addition, I exclude those ben-
eficiaries who had zero Medicare payments, received zero Medicare home health service
visits, or had any positive non-Medicare payment amount. I also exclude beneficiaries who
resided in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Island Areas, or unidentified counties. Medicare home
health patients whose agency information was not found in the CMS Provider of Services
File-Home Health Agency were also dropped. Additionally, I exclude one of the records in
cases in which two episodes had the same service start and end date and referred to the same
episode, but had separate records due to significant changes in the patient’s health condition
or the existence of an unclean claim. Furthermore, I drop episodes of care for beneficiaries
who died earlier, but received home health visits after their date of death. I further exclude
episodes in which home health care was interrupted because a patient was readmitted to a
hospital, entered a nursing home, died, and so on. Finally, I drop observations with missing
values for the variables used in my analysis.
I use data from 1999 through 2009 for my analysis of the number of Medicare patients
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and collapse the data to a higher level of aggregation (state-year cells). I use data from
2001 through 2009, for my analysis of the number of episodes per patient and the payment
amount per episode because the concept of episode was introduced with the implemen-
tation of the PPS in 2001. This unbalanced panel data set had 1,778,368 patient-episode
observations, which translates to 614,779 unique patients.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
Each of the following empirical models corresponds to one of my hypotheses.
2.5.1 Number of Patients
Hypothesis 1: Agencies increased the proportion of home health patients to increase prof-
its.
To address this hypothesis, I examine whether states with a relatively high for-profit
market share had higher price elasticity of home health supply. Given the assumption
that for-profit agencies are more likely to prioritize profit increase than non-profits, this
hypothesis indicates that agencies increased the proportion of home health patients with
the intention of increasing profits under the PPS.
I test whether differences in the price elasticity of home health supply across states
are explained by each state’s home health market ownership structure, which I measure by
for-profit agency market share, for-profit hospital market share, and the presence of a CON
program for home health agencies in each state in 2000. (No state experienced a change in
the presence or absence of CON programs for home health agencies during the PPS.)
In particular, I pick the year 2000 to avoid possible endogeneity problems, in which an
increase in the proportion of home health patients drives the increase in for-profit agencies
during the PPS. However, each state’s unobservable heterogeneity might have simultane-
ously affected the state’s price elasticity of home health supply and home health market
structure in 2000.
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To address the endogeneity problem more rigorously, I further examine how for-profit
hospital market share in 2000 is associated with price elasticity of home health supply.
Grabowski and Hirth (2003) argued that non-profit hospital market share (and thus for-
profit hospital market share) is likely based on historical factors such as each city’s age,
voluntarism, and charitable provision. Likewise, for-profit home health agency market
share is likely to depend on each region’s historical factors, and thus be highly correlated
with for-profit hospital market share that might not be directly influenced by changes in the
number of home health patients.
As another way to address the endogeneity problem, I check how the presence of CON
program affected price elasticity. States with CON program are expected to have a lower
for-profit market share because CON prevents new agencies (mostly for-profits) from en-
tering the market under the PPS.
The basic estimating equation takes the following form:
Ys = α + γ1Ms +XsB + εs (2.1)
where Ys refers to price elasticity of home health supply in state s, (%∆Users/%∆Ps),
measuring the proportional change in the fraction of Medicare beneficiaries utilizing home
health services in each state s divided by the proportional change in reimbursement rate
in that state s between 2000 and 2009. Ms can represent for-profit agency market share,
for-profit hospital market share, or the presence of a CON program for home health agen-
cies in each state in 2000. Xs includes various demographic characteristics of each state’s
beneficiaries in 2000, including gender and age (65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-89, and 90+)
distribution, race composition (white, black, and others), the proportion of married bene-
ficiaries, the proportion of dual-eligible beneficiaries, the proportion of beneficiaries who
resided with any child, and the proportion of beneficiaries who died. γ1 measures how each
state’s home health market ownership structure influenced price elasticity of home health
supply. γ1 is expected to be positive in cases when Ms is for-profit agency market share or
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for-profit hospital market share.
2.5.2 Number of Episodes per Patient
Hypothesis 2: Agencies treated their patients for a higher number of episodes of care to
increase profits, and this tendency was stronger among for-profit agencies.
To address this hypothesis, I examine whether the profitability of treating a patient in-
fluenced an agency’s recertification decision. It may seem ideal to run a regression of each
patient’s likelihood of recertification on his/her profitability. However, this relationship is
endogenous. This is because the unreported patient health status becomes confounded with
patient profitability and likelihood of recertification. In essence, I do not have access to de-
tailed enough information about patient health status to control for it in my regression. For
example, no information was available regarding changes in patient health status during the
middle or end of an episode of care or the presence of specific health conditions not catego-
rized by CMS. However, both of these factors affect patient profitability and likelihood of
recertification. A decline in patient health status during an episode, for instance, generally
requires an agency to provide extra service visits not reflected in the case-mix group rate
assigned at the time of admission, thus lowering the profitability of that patient during that
particular episode.
To address this endogenous relationship, I limit my sample to episodes where only four
or five visits were provided. If patients received fewer than five home health visits, then
they became eligible for low-cost outlier payments. Low-cost outlier payment rates were
much lower than standard prospective payment rates, and thus agencies perceive patients
who received four visits unprofitable compared to patients with five visits. However, there
was only one visit difference between patients with four and five visits. Therefore, I expect
to see little variation in unobservable heterogeneous health conditions among patients and
therefore endogeneity is not a significant concern.
With this limited sample, I estimate regression (2.2) and then compute the marginal
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effect of low-cost outlier patients on the likelihood of recertification each year, which mea-
sures how each low-cost outlier patient’s likelihood of recertification changed over time
compared to a non low-cost outlier patient’s.







β3tyeart × lupaijkt +XB + states + εijkt (2.2)
where i, j, k and t refer to a patient, agency, episode, and year. Pr(recert) is a dummy vari-
able indicating whether a patient was recertified for a subsequent episode of care. year is
year dummy variables (2001-reference group). lupa represents a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether a patient was a low-cost outlier patient. X refers to each patient and agency’s
basic characteristics, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (the measure of level of market concen-
tration), and seasonality. I also include state fixed effects states because each state might
have different regulations that influence Medicare home health service provision. (Refer to
the Appendix A.2 for more specific explanation of each control variable.)
In addition, in order to check whether for-profit and non-profit agencies exhibited dif-
ferent trends in recertification of low-cost outlier patient, I add the three-way interaction
term between year dummy variables, the indicator of low-cost outlier patient, and the in-
dicator of agency ownership. The coefficient of the interaction term measures how each
low-cost outlier patient’s likelihood of recertification in non-profit agencies differed over
time compared to for-profit agencies. This marginal effect is expected to be positive.
2.5.3 Payment Amount Per Episode
Hypothesis 3: Agencies adjusted the types and number of services, which increased the
payment amount per episode, and the degree of the adjustment was greater among for-profit
agencies.
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2.5.3.1 Types of Service Visits
Payment incentives built into the PPS encouraged agencies to adjust the type of home
health services. To examine this hypothesis, I run regression (2.3) where outcomeijkt rep-
resents dummy variables which indicate whether each patient received at least one skilled
nursing, therapy, and home health aide visit in each episode. I then compute the marginal
effect of year dummy variables on outcome variables, which measures how each patient’s
likelihood of receiving any skilled nursing, therapy, and home health aide visits per episode
changed over time. The marginal effect is expected to be positive if outcomeijkt is the like-
lihood of receiving any therapy visits, but negative for the likelihood of receiving any home
health aide visits. I also examine whether for-profit and non-profit agencies exhibited dif-
ferent trends in adjusting the type of home health service by computing the marginal effect
of non-profit agencies compared to for-profit agencies on outcome variables each year.







β3tyeart × ownershipjkt +XB + states) (2.3)
2.5.3.2 Number of Service Visits
The non-linear pricing for home health service visits led agencies to target a certain
number of service visits. To address this hypothesis, I investigate whether agencies targeted
10 or more therapy visits (for patients who received at least one therapy visit) under the
PPS. I also examine whether this tendency was greater among for-profit agencies.
For this examination, I utilize the Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux’s (hereafter DFL)
decomposition (1996). The use of the DFL method is ideal because it enables to check
changes in the entire distribution of the number of service visits over time (Dinardo, 2002).
The DFL method visually decomposes the difference in the distribution of the number of
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service visits between 2001 and 2007 into two parts: differences attributable to changes in
1) the observable variables affecting the number of service visits (composition effects) and
2) the number of service visit determination mechanism (structure effects)(Olson, 1998).
In particular, I focus on structure effects that measure the agencies’ response to the pay-
ment incentives and examine whether agencies intentionally increased the provision of 10
or more therapy visits between 2001 and 2007.
I also use the DFP method to address how for-profit and non-profit agencies were dif-
ferent in their adjustment in the number of service visits in 2001 and 2007. The differences
in the distribution of the number of service visits between for-profit and non-profit agencies
are decomposed into composition and structure effects. Structure effects address whether
for-profit agencies were more likely to target 10 or more therapy visits, taking into account
the observable variables. (Refer to Appendix A.3 for more specific information of the use
of the DFL method.)
2.5.4 Service Provision among New Home Health Agencies
Hypothesis 4: Agencies that entered the market under the PPS were more likely to pursue
profitable service provision patterns than existing agencies.
New home health agencies might have started their businesses under the PPS because
they recognized that the incentives built into the PPS would enable them to achieve high
profit margins. Furthermore, existing agencies might have enjoyed more stable budget
sources, which would have provided weaker incentives for following profitable home health
service provision patterns. Consequently, new agencies would have been more likely than
existing agencies to follow the specific home health provision patterns that lead to high
profits. To examine this hypothesis, I limit my sample to home health episodes that oc-
curred in 2007, and I examine how home health service provision patterns (i.e., likelihood
of recertification, providing 7-9 therapy visits per episodes, and providing 10-13 therapy
visits per episode) differed depending on the starting year of each home health agency, by
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agency ownership type. As a robustness check, I also limit my sample to home health
episodes that occurred in 2005 and 2006, and conduct the same analysis. The basic esti-
mating equation takes the following form:




where establishmentyearjn is a vector of dummy variables that represent the starting year
(n) of each home health agency (reference group: n ≤ 2000, i.e., agencies that entered the
market prior to the PPS).
I estimate regression (2.4) and compute the marginal effect of each agency’s establish-
ment year, which measures how each new agency’s home health service provision patterns
varied depending on the establishment year. The reference group for this measurement is
agencies established prior to the PPS. The marginal effect is expected to be positive when
outcomeijk is a profitable home health service provision pattern and vice versa.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Number of Patients
As my conceptual model predicted, states with a relatively high for-profit market share
tended to have a relatively high price elasticity of home health supply (see Table 2.2). This
result consistently holds in all three regressions where I use a different measure of for-profit
market share to deal with the endogeneity problem.
First, for-profit agency market share had a positive association with price elasticity: the
one percentage point increase in for-profit agency market share was associated with the
increase in price elasticity of home health supply by .0052. However, this estimate might
be biased due to unobservable state characteristics. To address this potential endogeneity
problem, I also examine the association between for-profit hospital market share and price
elasticity. They turn out to have a stronger positive association: the one percentage point in-
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crease in for-profit hospital market share predicts the higher price elasticity by .010. Lastly,
I also check the association between the presence of CON program in each state and price
elasticity of home health supply. The result shows that states with no CON program had
higher price elasticity of home health supply. Without a state’s control over the establish-
ment of new home health agencies, new agencies (mostly for-profits) were more likely to
enter the market under the PPS and increased for-profit market share.
These results indicate that the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries using home health
services increased to a greater degree in states with more for-profit agencies and fewer
non-profit agencies. That is, agencies increased the proportion of home health patients to
increase profits, assuming that for-profits are more likely interested in profit increase.
2.6.2 Number of Episodes Per Patient
Interestingly, a low-cost outlier patients’ likelihood of recertification was higher than
a non low-cost outlier patients’ during the early years of the PPS (see Figure 2.4). For
example, in 2003, patients who received four visits were more likely to get recertified for
another episode of care by 4.49 percentage points, as compared to those with five visits.
This is inconsistent with my prediction that agencies were more likely to recertify profitable
patients. It is not clear why agencies were more likely to recertify unprofitable patients
during the early years of the PPS.
However, this discrepancy in the likelihood of recertification between patients who re-
ceived four and five visits decreased gradually over time. Actually, the difference was
not significant any longer after 2005. Assuming that agencies gradually learned how to
increase profits under the PPS, the described change suggests that agencies increasingly
chose not to recertify low-cost outlier patients probably because those patients were rela-
tively unprofitable. This result is consistent with my hypothesis that agencies were more
likely to recertify a subsequent episode of care for more profitable patients.
There was a clear difference between for-profit and non-profit agencies’ recertification
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behaviors. During the early years of the PPS, for-profit agencies were more likely to re-
certify a low-cost outlier patients than non-profits were. However, for-profits drastically
decreased the recertification of low-cost patients compared to non low-cost patients over
time. Actually, starting in 2009, for-profits recertified patients non low-cost patients more
than low-cost patients. That is, for-profits were more likely to recertify non low-cost outlier
patients who were more profitable. In contrast, non-profits were consistently more likely to
recertify low-cost patients than non low-cost patients, and this tendency did not change over
time. (The regression result regarding the difference between for-profits and non-profits is
available upon the request.)
2.6.3 Payment Amount Per Episode
2.6.3.1 Types of Service Visits
Agencies sought to increase each patient’s payment amount per episode by adjusting
the types of home health service provided. For example, each patient’s likelihood of re-
ceiving any home health aide visits (which were not compensated for extra visits pro-
vided) decreased gradually under the PPS, whereas the likelihood of any therapy visits
(which promised a substantial marginal benefit for the 10th therapy visit) increased (see
Figure 2.5 (b) and Figure 2.5 (c)). Furthermore, each patient’s likelihood of receiving any
skilled nursing visits (a core service that agencies did not receive compensation for extra
visits provided) increased only slightly until 2005, and in fact has started to decrease since
then (see Figure 2.5 (a)). However, this slight change in the predicted likelihood was not
significant most years, which might be due to a ceiling effect. That is, the proportion of
episodes with any skilled nursing visit is already close to 1, and there is little room left
for the proportion to increase or decrease. Thus, it is hard to examine an agency’s actual
adjustment of skilled nursing visit provision in response to the PPS.
The influence of an agency’s ownership status on its adjustment of the type of services
provided was not in line with my hypothesis. The likelihood of providing any therapy,
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home health aide, and skilled nursing visit did not differ among for-profit and non-profit
agencies during most years of the PPS. (The regression result regarding the difference be-
tween for-profits and non-profits is available upon the request.) This is inconsistent with
my hypothesis that for-profit agencies would seek to provide more therapy visits but less
home health aide visits than non-profit agencies. One possible explanation for these un-
expected results is that there might be unobservable differences between for-profit and
non-profit agencies in patient health conditions. For instance, for-profit agencies might be
more likely to serve patients who had unmeasured needs for home health aide visits. If so,
the regression estimate could be biased.
2.6.3.2 Number of Service Visits
Home health agencies adjusted the number of service visits provided per episode in
order to maximize payment per episode. First, agencies gradually increased the likelihood
of providing 10-13 therapy visits under the PPS, which set the marginal benefit for the 10th
therapy visit substantially high while the marginal benefit for all other numbers of therapy
visits was zero. The DFL decomposition result illustrates that there is a big bump in the
distribution at 10-13 therapy visits and the bump became more significant between 2001
and 2007 (see Figure 2.6 (a)). The counterfactual distribution shows what the distribu-
tion of the number of therapy visits would be in 2001 with observable characteristics of
the year 2001, holding the number of therapy visit determination mechanism (agencies’ re-
sponse to payment incentives) in 2007 fixed. Comparing the actual distribution in 2001 and
the counterfactual distribution, I find that agencies intentionally decreased provisions with
fewer than 10 and more than 15 therapy visits, while increasing provisions with 10 to 13
therapy visits between 2001 and 2007. However, this targeting of 10-13 therapy visits sud-
denly disappeared in 2008 when Medicare modified the way the number of therapy visits
was factored into reimbursement amounts (see Figure 2.6 (b)). Interestingly, the actual dis-
tribution in 2008 and the counterfactual distribution (which illustrates what the distribution
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would be in 2007, assuming the observables of the year 2007 and the number of therapy
visit determination mechanism of the year 2008) are almost the same, indicating that the
huge change in the actual distribution between 2007 and 2008 was mostly due to agencies’
response to the change in the reimbursement schedule, not changes in observables.
I find clear differences in the number of therapy visits provided between for-profit and
non-profit agencies. Comparing the actual distribution of non-profit agencies and the coun-
terfactual distribution (which illustrates what the distribution of therapy visits would be
among non-profit agencies, assuming the observables of non-profits and the number of
therapy visit determination mechanism of for-profits) in the DFL decomposition, I find that
for-profit agencies were generally more likely to provide 10-13 therapy visits and less likely
to provide fewer than 10 therapy visits than for-profits (see Figure 2.7). These findings in-
dicate that, as my conceptual model predicted, for-profits were more likely to target 10-13
therapy visits per episode to benefit from the high marginal benefit of the 10th therapy visit.
2.6.4 Service Provision among New Home Health Agencies
For-profit home health agencies that entered the market under the PPS pursued profit-
seeking behaviors more than their for-profit counterparts established prior to the PPS (see
Figure 2.8). For example, those new for-profit entrants were more likely to recertify another
episode of care and provide 10-13 therapy visits per episode, but less likely to provide
7-9 therapy visits per episode. However, new non-profit agencies behaved the same as
existing counterparts. These results stayed essentially the same when I limit my sample
to 2005, 2006, or 2007. Given that a number of home health agencies, mostly for-profits,
continued to enter the market throughout the PPS, the profit-seeking behavior of new for-
profit agencies not only contributed to Medicare home health spending growth but also
explains the gradual adjustments in home health service provision patterns under the PPS.
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2.7 Decomposition
2.7.1 Contribution of Each of the Three Factors to Spending Growth
All three factors, the number of home health patients, the number of episodes per pa-
tient, and the payment amount per episode, contributed to the aggregate home health spend-
ing increase under the PPS. This section briefly examines the extent to which each of these
three components contributed to the total spending increase between 2001 and 2009 us-
ing the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method. This method estimates how much of the
spending increase was attributable to increases in each of the factors (explained variation)
and how much was attributable to changes in the relationship between each factor and total
spending (unexplained variation) (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011; Fortin et al., 2011). I focus
on the explained variation and analyze the relative contribution of each of the three factors
to the total spending increase. (Refer to Appendix A.4 for a more detailed explanation of
how I apply this decomposition method to the context of Medicare home health spending
increases). The decomposition results suggest that the increase in the proportion of Medi-
care beneficiaries utilizing home health services contributed the most to the total spending
increase under the PPS. The number of episodes per patient and the payment amount per
episode contributed the second most and the least to the total spending increase between
2001 and 2009, respectively.
2.7.2 Contribution of For-Profit Market Share Increase to Spending Growth
The for-profit agency market share increased from 48 percent to 60 percent between
2001 and 2009. This increase in for-profit market share further accelerated total home
health spending growth because new for-profit agencies that entered the market under the
PPS were more likely to adopt profitable service provision patterns than existing agencies.
This phenomenon leads to the following question: how much did the increase in the for-
profit market share contribute to the increase in total Medicare home health spending?
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To answer this question, I collapse the 2001 to 2009 data into the state level (N=459)
and run a regression of four different dependent variables (home health spending per Medi-
care beneficiary, proportion of home health patients, number of episodes per patient, and
payment amount per episode in each state in each year. These four terms are represented in








on each state’s for-profit market share in each year. I also control for each state’s basic de-
mographic characteristics, state indicators, and year dummy variables. The coefficient of
for-profit market share is then obtained in each of the four separate regressions (see Table
2.3, column (1)). I also compute the change in the value of the four factors between 2001
and 2009 (see Table 2.3, Column (2)). Then the implied contribution of the increase in for-
profit market share to the actual change in the four factors from 2001 to 2009 is calculated.
This calculation is equal to the coefficient estimates in the first column times the change
in the for-profit market share between 2001 and 2009 (12 percent increase) (see Table 2.3,
Column (3)). In the last column, I show how much the for-profit market share increase
contributed to the increase in each of the four factors by dividing the implied contribution
in the third column by the change in each factor in the second column.
This approach suggests that the increase in the for-profit market share explains about
one third of the increase in total spending between 2001 and 2009. For the same period,
the for-profit market share increase explains roughly 34, 42, and 19 percent of the increase
in the proportion of home health patients, the number of episodes per patient, and payment
amount per episode, respectively. However, this result is suggestive because the causal
influence of for-profit share on each of the four factors might not be clear.
2.8 Discussion
The Medicare home health PPS, the system that was introduced to curb rising Medicare
home health spending, provided unintended supply-side incentives that contributed heavily
to an increase in the number of Medicare home health patients, the number of episodes per
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patient, and the payment amount per episode, all of which led to a significant increase in
total Medicare home health spending. In particular, the rising number of Medicare home
health patients contributed the most to the total spending increase.
The proportion of Medicare beneficiaries utilizing home health services dramatically
increased under relatively generous prospective reimbursement rates. This increase was
more salient in states with a relatively high number of for-profit agencies per capita and a
relatively high for-profit market share. This suggests that home health agencies increased
the number of patients to increase profits in response to relatively generous prospective
reimbursement rates. In addition, limited guidelines on eligibility criteria for Medicare
home health care enabled agencies to admit patients who might not have needed home
health care, contributing to the increase in the number of patients.
Total Medicare home health spending was also significantly inflated by the increasing
number of episodes per patient. Agencies increased profits by providing a greater number
of episodes of care for more profitable patients. In addition, loose CMS guidelines about
recertification decisions allowed agencies to easily recertify an additional episode of care
and thus increase their profits. Although regulations stipulated that a physician be involved
in the recertification decision process, anecdotally, most physicians made these decisions
based on information provided by agencies via phone conversations (Brega et al., 2002).
Agencies also manipulated the system by adjusting the type and number of service visits
to raise the payment amount per episode. For instance, agencies targeted 10-13 therapy
visits per episode to benefit from the high marginal benefit of the 10th therapy visit. This
dynamic also caused agencies to shift their service provision toward therapy visits and away
from relatively less profitable home health services such as skilled nursing or home health
aide visits.
Throughout this study, I find that for-profit agencies were more likely to adopt prof-
itable service provision patterns under the PPS. Given that the start-up cost of a home
health agency is relatively low, it is likely that the incentives built into the PPS attracted an
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increasing number of for-profit agencies. This is important because new for-profit agen-
cies prioritized profits more strongly and thus contributed significantly to the increase in
total Medicare home health spending. Overall, the for-profit market share increase under
the PPS accounts for about one third of the total spending increase. Had the home health
industry been dominated by non-profit agencies, the increase in total spending might have
been lower.
Interestingly, an increase in all three components of total Medicare home health spend-
ing could be viewed as desirable. Medicare home health care holds the potential to create
savings in total Medicare spending because it is substitutable with more costly health care
services. Home health care can replace more expensive skilled nursing home or inpatient
care by allowing patients to receive necessary medical care at home. This substitution
would lower health spending, an important benefit given the current anti-spending political
environment (Benjamin, 1993). While such an expansion of home health care spending
may be beneficial, an increase in home health spending caused by the inadvertent inclusion
of improper incentives is undesirable and wasteful of resources. Future reimbursement
policies must be carefully structured to encourage home health agencies to effectively bal-
ance cost efficiency and quality of care.
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Table 2.1: Major Changes to the Medicare Home Health Reimbursement System
Fee-For-Service Interim Payment System Prospective Payment
System System
Time Period 1965 (Medicare Oct, 1997 to Sep, 2000 Oct, 2000 to Present
Establishment Year) to
Sep, 1997
Payment Amount Actual costs with The lowest of 1)actual The fixed payment
service-specific per-visit cost 2)new-per-visit corresponding to
limit, but not with limits or 3)annual patient’s case-mix with
per-beneficiary limits per-patient limit which additional adjustment for
was the weighted low number of visits or
average of each agency’s usually high-cost
1994 average per-patient outliers
cost and the census
region’s 1994 average
per-patient cost*
Payment Period Every 60 days
*Most agencies fell under the annual per-patient limit which was the same across all patients regard-
less of their health condition or duration of care.
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Table 2.2:
Factors Associated with State Variation in Price Elasticity of Home Health Sup-
ply
%∆Users/%∆Ps
FP HHA mktshr (0-100) .0052(.0016)***
FP HOSP mktshr (0-100) .010(.0030)***
CON -.12(.066)*
Note: Other control variables include age
distribution(65-69-reference group, 70-74, 75-
79, 80-89, and 90+), race composition(white-
reference group, black, and others), the propor-
tion of female beneficiaries, the proportion of mar-
ried beneficiaries, the proportion of dual-eligible
beneficiaries, the proportion of beneficiaries who
resided with any child, and the proportion of ben-
eficiaries who died in 2000. Equations are esti-
mated using an ordinary least squares regression.
*p≤0.1, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01
Table 2.3:
Contribution of the For-Profit Market Share Increase to the Total Spending In-
crease between 2001 and 2009
Factor (1) For-Profit (2) Change from (3) For-Profit (3)/(2)
Market Share 2001 to 2009 Contribution
(0-100) (=(1)×(2))
Proportion of Home Health Patients .00049(.00017)*** .017 .0058 .34
Episodes per Patient .0046(.0020)** .13 .055 .42
Payment per Episode .0035(.0021)* .22 .042 .19
(in Thousand Dollars)
Total Spending per Beneficiary .0032(.0010)*** .12 .039 .33
(in Thousand Dollars)
Note: *p≤0.1, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01
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Figure 2.1: Medicare Home Health Spending under the Different Systems
Note: 1) Source: Medicare and Medicaid Research Review, 2011 Statistical Supplement. 2) Medicare home
health care was under the fee-for-service payment system until September, 1997; the interim payment system
between October, 1997-September, 2000; and has been under the prospective payment system since October,
2000. 3) All numbers are in 2001 real dollars.
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Figure 2.2: Proportion of Medicare Beneficiaries Utilizing Home Health Services
(a) For-Profit and Non-Profit Agency’s Short-Run Sup-
ply Curve: a for-profit agency has a more elastic supply
curve because for-profit agencies tend to be more re-
sponsive to changes in government reimbursement rates.
(b) State-Level Market Supply Curve (1): Texas with
a higher for-profit market share, had a higher interim
payment rate and a more elastic supply curve than did
New Jersey.
(c) State-Level Market Supply Curve (2): Texas at-
tracted more new agencies to the market and thus Texas’
supply curve shifted to the right to a greater degree.
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Figure 2.3: Number of Therapy Visits per Episode in 2001
(a) Medicare Prospective Reimbursement Schedule (b) Profit
(c) Number of Visits (d) Number of Visits: 4 vs 5 and 9 vs 10
(e) Number of Visits: For-Profit vs Non-Profit
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Figure 2.4:
Marginal Effects (and 95% Confidence Intervals) of Low-cost Outlier Patients
(Reference Group: Non Low-cost Outlier Patients) on the Likelihood of Recer-
tification of Each Episode of Care
Note: I restrict the sample to episodes where four or five visits were provided.
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Figure 2.5:
Likelihood of Providing Any Skilled Nursing, Therapy, and Home Health Aide
Visits per Episode between 2001 and 2009
(a) Any Skilled Nursing Visits
(b) Any Therapy Visits
(c) Any Home Health Aide Visits
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Figure 2.6: PDF of the Number of Therapy Visits by Year
(a) Year: 2001 vs 2007
(b) Year: 2007 vs 2008
Note: 1) In Figure 2.6 (a), ’YR=2001’ and ’YR=2007’ represent the actual distribution of the number of
therapy visits in 2001 and 2007, respectively. ’Counterfactual’ illustrates what the distribution of the number
of therapy visits would be in 2001 with observable characteristics of the year 2001, holding the number of
therapy visit determination mechanism in 2007 fixed. 2) In Figure 2.6 (b), ’YR=2007’ and ’YR=2008’ rep-
resent the actual distribution of the number of therapy visits in 2007 and 2008, respectively. ’Counterfactual’
illustrates what the distribution of the number of therapy visits would be in 2007 with observable character-
istics of the year 2007, holding the number of therapy visit determination mechanism in 2008 fixed. 3) In
Figures 2.6 (a) and 2.6 (b), I restrict the sample to episodes with at least one therapy visit provided and to
episodes ineligible for low-cost or high-cost outlier payments.40
Figure 2.7: PDF of the Number of Therapy Visits by Ownership Type
(a) Year: 2001
(b) Year: 2007
Note: 1) ’NonProfit’ and ’ForProfit’ represent the actual distribution of the number of therapy visits among
non-profit and for-profit agencies, respectively. ’Counterfactual’ illustrates what the distribution of the num-
ber of therapy visits would be among non-profit agencies, assuming the observable characteristics of non-
profit agencies and the number of therapy visit determination mechanism of for-profit agencies. 2) In Fig-
ures 2.7 (a) and 2.7 (b), I restrict the sample to episodes with at least one therapy visit provided and to
episodes ineligible for low-cost or high-cost outlier payments.
41
Figure 2.8:
Marginal Effects (and 95% Confidence Interval) of Establishment Year (Ref-
erence Group: before 2001) on Service Provisions in 2007: For-Profit Home
Health Agencies
(a) Recertification (b) Providing 7-9 Therapy Visits
(c) Providing 10-13 Therapy Visits
Note: 1) The reference group is agencies that entered the market prior to the PPS (i.e. before 2001) 2) In
Figures 2.8 (b) and 2.8 (c), I restrict the sample to episodes that provided at least one therapy visit and were
ineligible for low-cost or high-cost outlier payments.
42
CHAPTER III
MARKET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND SERVICE
PROVISION PATTERN CHANGE OVER TIME:
EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE HOME HEALTH
CARE
3.1 Introduction
Many studies have explored how a health care provider’s ownership status influences
its service provision patterns. More recently, recognizing that each health care provider op-
erates in a market with the varied mix of for-profit and non-profit health care providers who
might potentially compete with each other, many studies have addressed the influence of
for-profit market share on service provision patterns across for-profit and non-profit health
care providers (Grabowski & Hirth, 2003; Horwitz & Nichols, 2009). However, most study
has addressed the cross-sectional effect of for-profit market share. Virtually no study has
examined the effect of for-profit market share over time, but this is a glaring omission given
that it typically takes time for health care providers to adjust service provision patterns.
This study suggests three mechanisms behind the gradual change in the influence of
for-profit market share on service provision patterns over time. First, health care providers
continue to enter the market if they perceive opportunities for high-profit margins, and
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those new entrants strategically pursue profit-seeking service provision patterns (i.e.,service
provision patterns that increase a providers profit but do not necessarily correspond to a
patients health needs) more than incumbents. Second, profit-seeking behaviors among
new entrants encourage neighboring incumbents to imitate new entrants’ behaviors. Third,
existing, chain-affiliated health care providers learn profit-seeking behaviors from others in
the chain.
I address this issue in the context of the Medicare home health care market under the
prospective payment system (PPS). In 2001, Medicare home health care introduced the
PPS, which made pre-determined payments based on patient health status, to control its
rapidly rising spending. However, retrospective features built into the PPS enabled home
health agencies to pursue profitable service provision patterns. Using seven years of Medi-
care Claims and Provider of Service Files of Home Health Agencies, I examine how for-
profit market share affected each agency’s provision of profitable services over time under
the PPS, and I further investigate whether the proposed mechanisms explain the gradual
change in the influence of for-profit market share.
My study finds that the influence of for-profit market share on profitable home health
service provisions (i.e., recertifying an episode of care and aiming for 10 or more therapy
visits per episode) increased gradually in for-profit and non-profit agencies over time un-
der the PPS. In other words, agencies incrementally adopted profitable service provision
patterns to compensate for losses stemming from the intense competition provoked by the
behaviors of for-profit home health agencies.
I also find that the suggested mechanisms, in particular the first and the last one, ex-
plain the gradual change in the influence of for-profit market share on home health service
provision patterns over time under the PPS, particularly among for-profit agencies. The
PPS attracted many for-profit agencies to the market, and those new for-profits engaged in
profit-seeking service provision practices to a greater degree. In addition, the profit-seeking
behaviors of new agencies led neighboring existing for-profit agencies to mimic those be-
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haviors, but this result was valid only for one type of profit-seeking behavior. Lastly, chain-
affiliated existing for-profits were more likely to resemble profit-seeking behaviors of other
agencies in their chain. Regarding non-profit agencies, the suggested mechanisms do not
explain it.
This study contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. First, this study is the
first to address changes in the effect of for-profit market share on service provision patterns
over time. Again, examining changes in the effect over time is important because health
care providers typically takes time to adjust service provision patterns. Second, this study
is also the first to propose the mechanisms behind the increased effect of for-profit market
share over time. These mechanisms can potentially explain behaviors of other health care
providers such as hospitals or nursing homes. Third, it is the first to examine the effect of
for-profit market share on service provision patterns of health care providers with different
ownership structures in the context of Medicare home health care.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Incentives built in the PPS
Medicare home health spending increased drastically under the fee-for-service payment
system that paid the incurred cost of patient care. To address this problem, Medicare home
health care introduced the PPS in 2000. The PPS made fixed and predetermined payments
that correspond to a patient’s case-mix group that a home health agency determined based
on a patient’s health conditions at the start of an episode of care. An episode of 60 days
is the unit Medicare home health care uses for a payment period. Because payments per
episode were fixed, agencies had to bear the burden of the full cost of extra treatments.
Hence, officials expected the PPS to restrict rising costs that had been occurring under the
fee-for-service payment system.
However, unintended incentives built into the Medicare home health PPS enabled agen-
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cies to manipulate the reimbursement system. Specifically, many home health agencies fo-
cused on four types of home health provision patterns and thus provided excessive services,
independent of patient needs. The four types of home health provision patterns include 1)
increasing the likelihood of recertifying episode of care, 2) increasing the likelihood of
providing 10-13 therapy visits per episode, 3) decreasing the likelihood of providing 7-9
therapy visits per episode, and 4) decreasing the likelihood of providing fewer than five
visits (regardless of service type) per episode.
Specific explanations of each type of home health service provision pattern follow.
First, home health agencies were increasingly likely to recertify an episode of care for each
patient independent of patient health. The PPS allowed a patient to receive an unlimited
number of episodes of care as long as a physician recertified episode of care. However,
guidelines about recertification decisions ”beneficiaries must need part-time or intermittent
skilled care to treat their illnesses or injuries and must be unable to leave their homes with-
out considerable effort, (MedPAC, 2011, p.177)” were not well-defined. Physicians often
made recertification decisions based on information provided by an agency. Therefore,
agencies could easily recertify an episode of care for each patient to increase profits.
Agencies also strategically adjusted the number of service visits per episode they pro-
vided. They took advantage of retrospective features embedded in the PPS, which adjusted
reimbursement amounts based on treatment levels provided. For example, agencies dra-
matically increased the proportion of episodes with at least 10 therapy visits and decreased
the proportion of episodes with 7 to 9 therapy visits. This was because the PPS reimbursed
a significantly higher amount for episodes involving 10 or more therapy visits. Moreover,
agencies drastically decreased the proportion of patients who received fewer than five visits
per episode (called a low-cost outlier episode). Medicare would make a per-visit payment
(called a low-cost outlier payment) for a low-cost outlier episode, instead of a standard
prospective payment. However, these low-cost outlier payments were generally perceived
as unprofitable because their payment rates were much lower than standard prospective
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payment rates. (See Figure 3.1 that illustrates the reimbursement schedule for an imagi-
nary home health patient who received physical therapy visits from a home health agency
located in Ann Arbor in 2001.)
In sum, home health agencies focused on these four types of home health service pro-
vision patterns to increase profits relatively easily under the PPS.
3.2.2 Past studies
To date, virtually no studies have examined how for-profit market share affected service
provision among health care providers with different ownership structure longitudinally.
Using eight years of data, Horwitz and Nichols (2009) examined the influence of for-profit
hospital market share on the types of medical services provided by for-profit, non-profit,
and government hospitals, but their analysis did not address time trends in the influence of
for-profit hospital market share. They found that non-profit hospitals in higher for-profit
markets tended to provide more profitable services, such as open-heart surgery or mag-
netic resonance imaging, but fewer unprofitable services, such as HIV-AIDS or psychiatric
emergency services, than did non-profit hospitals in markets with fewer for-profits. Hor-
witz and Nichols (2009) also found that non-profit hospitals in markets with high for-profit
market share were more likely to provide home health services when the Medicare reim-
bursement system made home health services profitable. Likewise, they were less likely to
offer home health services when reimbursement rates were restrictive. However, their find-
ings regarding home health services were confined to hospital-based home health agencies
which make up only a small fraction of all Medicare-certified home health agencies (17.44
percent in 2007). In addition, they only examined whether or not each hospital offered
home health services given different levels of for-profit market share. In contrast, I address
adjustments in four types of home health service provision patterns, which discussed above,
among both hospital-based and free-standing agencies. I also go beyond the prior literature
by investigating changes in the influence of for-profit market share over time, which could
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occur through the entry of new health care providers to the market or through the learning
process.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
My conceptual framework addresses 1) the influence of for-profit agency market share
on home health service provision patterns across for-profit and non-profit agencies over
time and 2) three mechanisms behind the gradual change in the influence of for-profit mar-
ket share on home health service provision patterns.
When examining agencies in isolation, home health service provision patterns across
for-profit and non-profit agencies are clearly distinguishable due to their different opera-
tional goals. For-profit agencies must distribute profits to individual shareholders and thus
have a strong incentive to follow profitable home health provision patterns (Sloan, 2000). In
contrast, non-profit agencies do not have well-defined shareholders and thus have a weaker
incentive to maximize profits (Golberstein et al., 2009). Instead, non-profits seek to maxi-
mize the quantity and quality of health care (Horwitz & Nichols, 2009; Newhouse, 1970).
Consequently, non-profits are less likely to pursue profitable home health service provision
patterns.
However, this distinction in home health service provision patterns across for-profit
and non-profit agencies becomes unclear once we consider competition across agencies in
a market. According to the firm output maximization model, non-profit home health agen-
cies are more likely to behave like for-profits in a market with more for-profits because non-
profits face the constraint of a zero-profit condition (Horwitz & Nichols, 2009; Newhouse,
1970). For example, under the PPS, as an increasing number of for-profit home health agen-
cies entered the market, the competition among agencies rose, and consequently, non-profit
agencies were predicted to lose their patients to for-profit competitors. This would have
left non-profits with not only fewer but also the less profitable patients because for-profit
agencies are likely to attract more profitable patients through strategies such as creaming,
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skimping, and dumping (Ellis, 1998; Horwitz & Nichols, 2009)). Accordingly, non-profit
revenues would decrease under this intense competition. Therefore, facing a zero-profit
constraint, non-profits might be driven to behave more like their for-profit counterparts and
adopt profitable service provision patterns. For-profit market share might also influence
home health service provision patterns among for-profit agencies. That is, as home health
market competition intensifies with more for-profits, each for-profit agency is more likely
to follow profitable home health service provision patterns to survive.
However, the effect of for-profit market share on home health service provision patterns
might not be found in the cross-sectional analysis. This is more so if an analysis focuses on
the first several years after a certain policy change because it typically takes time for home
health agencies to adjust service provision patterns responding to the competition provoked
by behaviors of for-profit agencies. However, if I focus instead on a longer duration, then
the effect of for-profit market share might become more significant over time.
I propose three mechanisms behind the gradual change in the influence of for-profit
market share on home health service provision patterns. First, the entry of new home
health agencies to the market might explain this gradual adjustment in home health ser-
vice provision patterns over time if new agencies behaved differently from existing ones
(i.e., agencies established prior to the PPS). A substantially high number of home health
agencies, mostly for-profits (95.73 percent), entered the market under the PPS (refer to
Figure 3.2). New home health agencies would engage in profit-seeking behaviors to a
greater degree due to the following three reasons. First, new agencies might enter the home
health market under the PPS because they know the PPS would enable them to achieve
high-profit margins. Second, existing home health agencies might have more stable budget
sources (Choi & Davitt, 2009) given that they survived the restrictive payment rates under
the interim payment system. Therefore, financial incentives built into the PPS might be less
attractive to existing agencies than to new ones. Third, new home health agencies tended
to be inefficient firms, facing higher input-costs (e.g., higher nurse or therapist wage). The
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supply of nurses and therapists is limited in a local market in the short-run, which might
cause agencies to compete each other to hire a qualified workforce in the market. Given
this competitive market, new agencies, which entered the market later and had not built a
firm relationship with local nurses and therapists, might have to pay higher wages to em-
ploy the same quality of nurses or therapists. Therefore, new agencies would have adopted
profit-increasing service provision patterns to a greater degree, but profits would be still
low because the costs for the new firms tend to be higher.
In addition, new home health agencies might have influenced home health provision
patterns among existing agencies. If new agencies with strong profit motive attracted prof-
itable patients, neighboring existing agencies would have to serve less profitable patients
only. If so, existing for-profit and non-profit agencies might be forced to follow profitable
home health provision patterns. Alternatively, existing agencies might identify profitable
home health service provision patterns by observing new agencies’ behaviors and volun-
tarily adopting those patterns. Either through competition or learning, as new agencies pur-
sued profits to a greater degree, existing agencies’ home health provision patterns would
more closely resemble those of new agencies.
Furthermore, if an existing agency was affiliated with a chain, its home health provi-
sion patterns would be influenced not only by neighboring new entrants, but also by other
agencies in the same chain. Agencies in one chain would be likely to follow similar home
health provision patterns because they operated under the same policies. In addition, the
chain might distribute the same booklets (such as annual reports) to all agencies in the
chain or might provide identical training to workers across agencies. All of these would
encourage agencies affiliated with the same chain to resemble each other in terms of home
health service provision patterns.
In sum, I suggest that the gradual adjustment in home health service provision patterns
under the PPS is explained by three mechanisms: the entry of new home health agencies
to the market, the influence of new agencies on existing agencies, and the fact that chain-
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affiliated agencies learned profitable service provision patterns from other agencies in the
same chain.
This conceptual framework leads to the following hypotheses. First, the influence of
for-profit market share on home health service provision patterns grew gradually over time
under the PPS. Second, agencies that entered the market under the PPS were more likely
to follow profitable home health provision patterns than existing agencies. Third, new
home health agencies influenced home health provision patterns among neighboring ex-
isting agencies. Fourth, chain-affiliated agencies adjusted home health service provision
patterns as a result of learning from the experiences of other agencies in the same chain.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
To examine these hypotheses, I must first define the market for the home health care
industry. I use the Hospital Referral Region (HRR), developed by the Dartmouth Atlas
of Health Care, as a local market for home health care. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health
Care divided the United States into 306 HRRs such that each HRR contains major referral
hospitals in which both major cardiovascular surgical procedures and neurosurgery are per-
formed (Chandra & Staiger, 2007; Dartmouth Atlas, 2012). The HRR-level analysis has
been used widely because individual HRRs reflect patient commuting patterns, which can
overcome limitations in studies that arbitrarily use a market definition of political bound-
aries, such as states and counties (Chandra & Staiger, 2007). Although originally developed
to identify a hospital market, the HRR works well as a home health market for two reasons.
First, empirical examination supports the use of the HRR as a home health market. Using
my datasets, I identify the county of residence of the patients treated by each home health
agency and find that the market for each home health agency closely resembles the HRR.
Second, the HRR represents the market for tertiary medical care and is closely linked to
geographic variation in health care usage. Given that many home health patients have had
prior hospital stays, using the HRR for a home health market is justifiable.
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Each of the following empirical models corresponds to one of my hypotheses.
3.4.1 Influence of for-profit market share over time
Hypothesis 1: The influence of for-profit market share on home health service provision
patterns grew gradually over time under the PPS.
A higher for-profit market share would increase competition. This in turn would en-
courage non-profit agencies to adopt profitable home health service provision patterns to
a greater degree upon a zero-profit condition. The intense competition in a market with
higher for-profit market share would also drive for-profit agencies to pursue profitable home
health service provision practices to a greater degree. However, the cross-sectional effect
of for-profit market share on service provision patterns might be found not at all or only in
later years of this study because the adjustments in service provision patterns would have
occurred gradually and I examine the initial years of the PPS (2001 to 2007). By con-
trast, the effect of for-profit market share might be significant in the longitudinal analysis
if home health agencies incrementally adopted profitable home health service provision
patterns over time.
To address this hypothesis, I estimate regression (3.1). In particular, following Grabowski
and Hirth (2003)’s approach, I estimate regression (3.1) by agency ownership type for each
patient, and thus exclude indicators of each home health agency’s ownership type, in or-
der to avoid a potentially high multicollinearity between the ownership type of each home
health agency and for-profit market share.
Pr(Yijkt) = β0 + β1LinearY eart + β2FPMarketShareht
+ β12LinearY eart × FPMarketShareht + β3HHIht + β4Agencyjt
+ β5Patientijkt + β6Seasonalityk +HRRh + εijkt (3.1)
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where i , j , k , h , and t refer to patient, home health agency, episode, hospital referral re-
gion, and year, respectively. Pr(Y ) refers to four aspects of home health service provision,
namely, the likelihood of recertification (i.e., the likelihood of being recertified for another
episode of care at the end of the current episode of care), the likelihood of receiving 10-13
therapy visits, the likelihood of receiving 7-9 therapy visits, and the likelihood of receiv-
ing fewer than 5 visits (regardless of service type). LinearY ear is a linear year variable.
FPMarketShare represents for-profit market share in the HRR in which an agency was
located. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures level of market
concentration. HHI is calculated as the sum of the squares of each agency’s share of total
episodes within each HRR in each year, and thus it ranges between 0 and 1.
Agency represents a vector of each home health agency’s basic characteristics, such as
number of employed nurses, physical therapists, and home health aides, and facility-based
status. Patient refers to a vector of each patient’s basic characteristics including age,
race/ethnicity, gender, the Medicare buy-in program participation status (a proxy of being
low-income given that the program helps pay Medicare premiums for low-income Medi-
care beneficiaries (FamiliesUSA, 1999), indicator for prior hospitalization or nursing stay,
indicators for most frequent major health diagnoses, and level of functional limitations. I
also control for Seasonality, an indicator variable for the first (reference group), second,
third, and last quarter of each year. Anecdotally, Medicare beneficiaries’ use of Medicare
home health care varies depending on the season, which can affect an agency’s behaviors.
I also included HRR , HRR fixed effects, to address the potentially endogenous rela-
tionship between for-profit market share and each agency’s home health service provision
pattern. An HRR with a particularly business-friendly environment might attract more for-
profit home health agencies to the market, and thus have relatively high for-profit market
share. Those HRRs might also be more likely to condone inappropriate home health ser-
vice provisions that do not necessarily correspond to patient health. Including HRR fixed
effects addresses this endogenous relationship by controlling for fixed unobservable char-
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acteristics in each home health market.
One caveat with the fixed effect approach is that HRR fixed effects cannot control for
time-varying unobservable heterogeneity across home health markets that might be cor-
related with for-profit market share. However, the environment that affects each region’s
home health care industry is unlikely to change over time. Grabowski and Hirth (2003)
argued that non-profit hospital market share (and thus for-profit hospital market share) is
likely based on historical factors such as each city’s age, volunteerism, and charitable pro-
visions. Since for-profit home health agency market share depends on these same factors,
they are also unlikely to change. I found that states like Texas and Louisiana that ex-
perienced rapid growth in Medicare home health care provision under the fee-for-service
payment system observed similarly dramatic expansions under the PPS. By contrast, states
like New Jersey and Massachusetts experienced similarly small expansions of Medicare
home health care provision under both payment systems. That is, the business environ-
ment that affected Medicare home health care provision in each region remained the same
over time. Therefore, I conclude that for-profit home health agency market share is not
correlated with changes in unobserved characteristics in individual HRRs. The fixed effect
approach could also have been limited if the within-HRR change in for-profit market share
was small because the influence of for-profit market share is identified solely in terms of
changes within each HRR over time. However, fortunately, for-profit market share within
each HRR changed greatly under the PPS, providing sufficient variation.
I estimate separate linear probability models for each dependent variable. In fact, all
results are essentially the same if I estimate probit models instead. However, I prefer the
individual OLS results due to the more straightforward inference with the interaction term
estimates. The standard errors are clustered on HRR.
The coefficient of my interest, β12, measures changes in the influence of for-profit home
health agency market share on each agency’s home health service provision patterns over
time, and is expected to be positive when Y is a profitable home health service provision
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pattern (i.e., recertifying another episode of care and providing 10-13 therapy visits per
episode).
3.4.2 Service provision among new home health agencies
Hypothesis 2: Agencies that entered the market under the PPS were more likely to follow
profitable home health provision patterns than existing agencies.
The entry of new home health agencies to the market explains the gradual adjustments
in home health service provision patterns among agencies under the PPS. New home health
agencies might have started their businesses under the PPS because they recognized that
the incentives built into the PPS would enable them to achieve high profit margins. Further-
more, existing agencies might have enjoyed more stable budget sources, which would have
provided weaker incentives for following profitable home health service provision patterns.
New agencies might be more inefficient firms with higher input costs, and therefore had to
pursue profitable service provision patterns to a greater degree. Consequently, new agen-
cies would have been more likely than existing agencies to follow the specific home health
provision patterns that lead to high profits.
To examine this hypothesis, I limit my sample to home health episodes that occurred in
2007 and examine how home health service provision patterns differed depending on the
starting year of each home health agency, by agency ownership type. The basic estimating
equations take the following form:
Pr(Yijk) = β0 +
2007∑
n=2001
β1nEntryY earjn + β2Agencyj
+ β3Patientijk + β4Seasonalityk +HRRh + εijk (3.2)
where EntryY ear is a vector of dummy variables that represent the starting year (n) of
each home health agency (reference group: n ≤ 2000 , i.e., agencies that entered the market
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prior to the PPS). The coefficient of my interest, β1n, measures how each new agency’s
home health service provision patterns varied depending on the year of establishment(n)
compared to the patterns of agencies established prior to the PPS. β1n is expected to be
positive when Y is a profitable home health service provision pattern (i.e., recertifying
another episode of care and providing 10-13 therapy visits per episode).
One caveat to this approach is that I examine only agencies that survived until 2007 in
this analysis. On average, it is likely that survived agencies pursed profit-seeking behaviors
to a greater degree because those who were not aggressive enough might find it hard to
survive in a market. Therefore, the results can be upward biased. To address this limitation,
I also restrict my sample to home health episodes that occurred in 2004, 2005, and 2006,
and run the same analysis.
3.4.3 Influence of new entrants on home health service provision among existing
agencies
Hypothesis 3: New home health agencies influenced home health provision patterns among
neighboring existing agencies.
In the presence of new home health agencies, existing home health agencies in the
same market might have adopted profitable home health provision patterns either through
competition or through a learning process. To examine this hypothesis, I evaluate the im-
portance of new agencies’ home health service provision patterns in determining each ex-
isting for-profit and non-profit agency’s service provision practice. Thus, I limit my sample
to episodes served by existing agencies, and further exclude episodes in HRRs with no
entrants. The basic estimating equations follow:
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+ β4Y eart + β5HHIht + β6Agencyjt + β7Patientijkt
+ β8Seasonalityk +HRRh + εijkt (3.3)
where Pr(Y ) represents existing agency’s home health service provision patterns. Y newfpht−1
is the proportion of specific home health service provision practice (Y ) of new for-profit
agencies in HRR h in year t− 1 . I assume existing agencies followed the past year’s home
health service provision practices of new for-profit agencies because it might take time
for agencies to adjust their service provision patterns. Likewise, Y existingfpht−1 and Y
nfp
ht−1 are
the proportion of specific home health service provision practice (Y ) of existing for-profit
agencies and non-profit agencies in HRR h in year t−1 , respectively. The coefficient of my
interest, β1 , measures how average home health provision behavior among new agencies
in a HRR affected service provision practice among existing agencies in the same HRR and
is expected to be positive.
3.4.4 Learning from the practices of agencies in the same chain
Hypothesis 4: Existing chain-affiliated agencies adjusted home health service provision
patterns as a result of learning from the experiences of other agencies in the chain.
If an existing agency was affiliated with a chain, it would have identified profitable
home health service provision patterns based on the experiences of other agencies in the
chain. To examine this hypothesis, I limit my sample to episodes served by existing, chain-
affiliated agencies and evaluate the importance of home health service provision patterns
among other agencies (including both existing and new ones) in the chain in determining
each agency’s service provision practice, by agency ownership type. The basic estimating
equations follow:
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Pr(Yijkt) = β0 + β1Y−jct−1 + β2Y eart + β3HHIht + β4Agencyjt
+ β5Patientijkt + β6Seasonalityk +HRRh + εijkt (3.4)
where Y−jct−1 is the proportion of specific home health service provision practice among
agencies (excluding agency j ) in the chain c in year t − 1. The coefficient of my interest,
β1 , measures how each chain-affiliated agency’s home health service provision patterns
were affected by the average service provision pattern among agencies in the chain, and is
expected to be positive.
3.5 Data
3.5.1 Datasets
I use data from: 1) the CMS 5% Limited Data Set-Denominator File from 2001 to
2007, 2) the CMS 5% Limited Data Set-Home Health Agency File from 2001 to 2007, and
3) the CMS Provider of Service File-Home Health Agency from 2001 to 2007. I use data
from 2001 through 2007 because the concept of episode was introduced with the imple-
mentation of the PPS in 2001 and CMS partially revised its home health reimbursement
system in 2008. The first dataset, which was extracted from Medicare claims, is a panel of
5 percent of Medicare beneficiaries and contains their basic demographic information such
as age, race, gender, and date of death, as well as Medicare HMO enrollment status. The
second dataset, which was also taken from Medicare claims, is also a panel of 5 percent
of Medicare home health patients and contains administrative information about each pa-
tient’s Medicare home health care service use (CMS, 2012). The last dataset was extracted
from the Online Survey and Certification Reporting System/ Quality Improvement Evalu-
ation System collected by the CMS Regional Offices (Choi & Davitt, 2009; CMS, 2012).
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It is a panel of all Medicare/Medicaid-certified home health agencies across the nation and
includes their basic agency information like location, ownership type, and date of initial
Medicare certification. I combine the first two datasets using each beneficiary’s ID number,
and create a complete Medicare claim dataset. The home health agency provider number
enables me to merge the combined Medicare claim dataset and CMS Provider of Service
File, resulting in a patient-agency linked, unbalanced panel data set. Each observation in
this dataset corresponds to a patient’s unique episode of care.
I limit my sample to Medicare beneficiaries who were 65 or older. I also drop benefi-
ciaries who were enrolled in Medicare HMOs because Medicare HMOs were not directly
influenced by Medicare reimbursement system changes. I further exclude those benefi-
ciaries with zero Medicare payments, zero Medicare home health service visits, or positive
non-Medicare payment amount as well as beneficiaries who resided in Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Island Areas, or unidentified county areas. Medicare home health patients whose agency
information was not found in the CMS Provider of Service File-Home Health Agency were
also dropped. Additionally, I exclude one of the records in cases in which two episodes had
the same service start and end date and referred to the same episode, but had separate
records due to significant changes in the patient’s health condition or the existence of an
unclean claim. I drop as well episodes of care for beneficiaries who died earlier, but re-
ceived home health visits after their date of death. I further exclude episodes in which home
health care was interrupted because a patient was readmitted to a hospital, entered a nursing
home, died, and so forth. I also exclude episodes that were treated by government home
health agencies. Finally, I drop observations with missing values for the variables used in
my analysis. These selection criteria created an unbalanced panel data set with 1,290,573
patient-episode observations, which translated to 498,798 unique patients.
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3.5.2 Key independent variable
The key independent variable is for-profit market share in the HRR in which an agency
was located. I compute for-profit market share as the proportion of for-profit home health
admissions out of total home health admissions in each HRR. Average for-profit market
share rose significantly under the PPS, from 0.49 in 2001 to 0.60 in 2007.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Influence of for-profit market share over time
The influence of for-profit market share on home health service provision increased
gradually over time, as predicted in my conceptual model.
In particular, the effect of for-profit market share on profitable service provision pat-
terns became increasingly stronger over time for both for-profit and non-profit agencies’
patients. For example, in 2001, the one-percentage point increase in for-profit market share
predicted 1.4 percentage point lower likelihood of recertification among for-profit agen-
cies (See Table 3.1, Column (1)). However, the influence of for-profit market share on the
likelihood of recertification gradually became stronger towards a positive direction over
time: Each year, the influence of for-profit market share on the likelihood of recertification
increased by 2.5 percentage points. I also find the similar pattern in the influence of for-
profit market share on the likelihood of providing 10-13 therapy visits for both for-profit
and non-profit agencies’ patients (See Table 3.1, Column (2)).
The effect of for-profit market share on unprofitable home health service provision
(each patient’s likelihood of receiving 7 to 9 therapy visits or of receiving fewer than five
visits) also became stronger over time towards a negative direction, but the coefficient esti-
mates are not statistically significant (See Table 3.1, Column (5)-(8)).
Overall, the results suggest that both for-profit and non-profit agencies were increas-
ingly likely to focus on recertification and the provision of 10 to 13 therapy visits to in-
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crease profits and thereby buffer the losses incurred from the intense competition caused
by higher for-profit market share.
3.6.2 Service provision among new home health agencies
For-profit home health agencies that entered the market under the PPS pursued profit-
seeking service provision patterns to a greater degree than their for-profit counterparts es-
tablished prior to the PPS. For instance, a patient’s likelihood of recertification was higher
if the patient was treated by for-profit agencies established in 2004 and 2006, as com-
pared to existing for-profit agencies, by 3.64 percentage points and 3.67 percentage points,
respectively (See Figure 3.3). The likelihood of providing 10-13 therapy visits was also
higher among for-profit agencies that entered the market in 2004 and 2006 than it was for
existing agencies, by 6.89 percentage points and 10.85 percentage points, respectively. In
addition, new for-profit agencies were less likely than existing ones to pursue unprofitable
home health service provisions including providing 7-9 therapy visits and providing fewer
than 5 visits. However, as discussed above, this finding might be driven partially by the fact
that I limit my sample to agencies that could survive until 2007. To address this limitation,
I also restrict my sample to episodes that occurred in 2004, 2005, and 2006, and run the
same analysis. The results were basically same.
Interestingly, overall, agencies that entered the market later years were more likely to
engage in profit-seeking behaviors to a greater degree. The coefficients estimates for entry
year of 2001 and 2006 are statistically different such that I can reject β1, 2001 = β1, 2006 at
conventional levels of significance for all regressions except the one with the likelihood of
providing 7-9 therapy visits. This explains the gradual adjustments in home health service
provision patterns under the PPS.
However, this trend was not found among new non-profit agencies. Actually, only
a few non-profit agencies (N=252) entered the market under the PPS, and coefficients in
regressions of new non-profit agencies have a much higher standard error. As an alternative
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to check how new non-profit agencies behaved, I pool all episodes in one regression and
include an interaction between each agency’s entry years with its ownership type. However,
the coefficient estimates are too imprecise.
3.6.3 Influence of new entrants on home health service provision among existing
agencies
New for-profit agencies affected neighboring existing agencies’ service provision pat-
terns only to a small degree. For example, if the average likelihood of recertification among
new for-profit agencies in year t− 1 was high, then existing for-profit and non-profit agen-
cies in the same market were also more likely to recertify an episode of care in year t.
However, this relationship is not statistically significant at the conventional levels of signif-
icance (See Table 3.2, Column (1) and (2)). This suggests that both existing for-profit and
non-profit agencies were not influenced by new entrants’ service provision patterns, which
is inconsistent with my prediction.
New for-profit agencies had a small effect on existing for-profit agencies’ provision of
10-13 therapy visits. The one percentage point higher average likelihood of providing 10-
13 therapy visits per episode among new for-profit agencies in year t − 1 was associated
with the 2.6 percentage point higher likelihood of providing 10-13 therapy visits among
existing for-profit agencies in year t. However, existing non-profit agencies’ provision of
10-13 therapy visits was not influenced by new for-profits’ 10-13 therapy visit provision.
Actually, the coefficient for non-profit agencies is negative although it was not statistically
significant.
Likewise, new for-profit agencies did not affect existing agencies’ likelihood of provid-
ing fewer or equal to 4 visits per episode or 7 to 9 therapy visits per episode.
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3.6.4 Learning from the practices of agencies in the same chain
If an existing agency was affiliated with a chain, its home health provision patterns were
influenced by the past year’s home health service provision practices of other agencies in
the chain. However, this relationship was valid only among for-profit agencies. Non-
profit agencies, if chain-affiliated, were not affected by service provision patterns of other
agencies in the same chain.
For instance, among for-profit agencies, the one percentage point higher likelihood of
recertification among other agencies in the chain in year t − 1 was associated with the
26 percentage point higher average likelihood of recertification for existing agencies in
year t (see Table 3.3). I find the same phenomenon in other types of home health service
provision including the likelihood of providing 10-13 therapy visits or the likelihood of
providing fewer or equal to 4 visits per episode.
3.7 Discussion
This study finds that the effect of for-profit home health agency market share on prof-
itable home health service provision practices increased over time. I further suggest three
mechanisms behind the gradual increase in the effect of for-profit market share over time
under the PPS. Those mechanisms include the entry of new home health agencies to the
market, the influence of new agencies on existing agencies, and the fact that chain-affiliated
agencies learned profitable service provision patterns from other agencies in the same
chain. In particular, I find these mechanisms explain the gradual change in the influence of
for-profit market share on service provision patterns over time for for-profit agencies, but
not for non-profit agencies.
It is necessary to mention a few potential limitations of this study. First, this study can-
not perfectly consider patient selection among agencies with different ownership structures.
This study controls for an individual patient’s main diagnoses and functional limitations,
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but does not have access to sufficiently detailed information about patient health status,
which may potentially bias estimates. Second, this study does not consider what might
happen in other health care settings during the study time period, that is, between 2001 and
2007. Because home health care can be a close substitute for nursing home and hospital
care to some degree, changes in those health care settings might influence the provision
of home health services. Third, this study cannot control for time-varying unobservable
heterogeneity across home health markets that might be correlated with for-profit agen-
cies’ market share. As discussed above, however, unobservable heterogeneity is unlikely
to change over time.
Despite these limitations, this study makes several important contributions. Notably,
this is the first study that addresses changes in the effect of for-profit market share over
time. In addition, it identifies three mechanisms behind the gradual change in the effect
of for-profit market share. Furthermore, it examines the effect of for-profit home health
agency market share on service provision across agencies with different ownership type,
which has not been studied elsewhere.
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Figure 3.1: Medicare Prospective Reimbursement Schedule in 2001
Note: This figure illustrates the Medicare prospective reimbursement schedule for a patient who received
physical therapy visits only from a home health agency located in Ann Arbor, MI in 2001. This patient’s
case-mix group was C1F3S0 when the patient received fewer than 10 therapy visits, but switched to C1F3S2
once the number of therapy visits reached 10.
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Figure 3.2: Number of Home Health Agencies, by Ownership Type: 1995-2010
Note: 1)Source: The CMS Provider of Services File- Home Health Agency 1995-2010, 2)Medicare Home
Health was under the Fee-For-Service Payment System until 1997, Interim Payment System between 1998-




Marginal Effects of Starting Year on Service Provision Pattern among For-
Profit Agencies in 2007
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Note: The reference group of starting year of each home health agency is ≤2000 (i.e., agencies that entered
the market prior to the PPS)
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Table 3.1:
Changes in the Influence of For-Profit Home Health Agency Market Share on Profitable Home Health Service Provision
across For-Profit and Non-Profit Agencies over Time
Pr(Recertification) Pr(10≤Therapy Visit≤13) Pr(7≤Therapy Visit≤9) Pr(Visit≤4)
Covariate (1)For-Profit (2)Non-Profit (3)For-Profit (4)Non-Profit (5)For-Profit (6)Non-Profit (7)For-Profit (8)Non-Profit
Year −.014 ∗ ∗∗ −.0026∗ .0027 .0028∗ −.0072∗∗∗ −.0048∗∗∗ .0064 ∗ ∗ .0061 ∗ ∗
(.0038) (.0015) (.0033) (.0015) (.0024) (.0017) (.0031) (.0026)
FPMarketShare −.093∗ −.14 ∗ ∗∗ −.036 −.051 .016 .020 .084 ∗ ∗ .026
(.054) (.039) (.035) (.033) (.021) (.028) (.039) (.049)
Year×FPMarketShare .025 ∗ ∗∗ .0093 ∗ ∗ .0075∗ .013 ∗ ∗∗ −.00053 −.0047 −.0019 −.0061
(.0045) (.0046) (.0037) (.0043) (.0030) (.0036) (.0015) (.0052)
Observations 640,782 569,864 186,521 174,590 186,521 174,590 123,344 166,633
Note: I ran all regressions, separately by agency ownership type. Other control variables include patient characteristics (age, race, gender, participation
in Medicare Buy-in Program, prior hospitalization or nursing home stay, major health conditions, and level of functional limitation), agency character-
istics(number of registered nurses, physical therapists, and home health aides, and facility-based status), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and seasonality.
Equations are estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered on hospital referral region.
*p≤0.1, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01
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Table 3.2: The Influence of Neighboring New Agencies on Home Health Service Provision Practices among Existing Agencies
Pr(Recertified) Pr(10≤V T≤13) Pr(7≤V T≤9) Pr(V≤4)
Covariate (1)For-Profit (2)Non-Profit (3)For-Profit (4)Non-Profit (5)For-Profit (6)Non-Profit (7)For-Profit (8)Non-Profit
New FP .0098 .0093 .026∗ −.0016 .00070 .0076 −.0059 −.0031
(.012) (.0072) (.015) (.010) (.013) (.010) (.013) (.010)
Existing FP .35 ∗ ∗∗ .058 ∗ ∗ −.078 −.015 −.13 ∗ ∗∗ −.047 −.0072 .018
(.047) (.024) (.036) (.036) (.047) (.033) (.045) (.026)
NFP .030 .19 ∗ ∗∗ .0055 −.039 .010 −.096 ∗ ∗ .013 −.070
(.020) (.048) (.028) (.050) (.025) (.038) (.026) (.057)
Note: I ran all regressions, separately by agency ownership type. Other control variables include patient characteristics (age, race, gen-
der, participation in Medicare Buy-in Program, prior hospitalization or nursing home stay, major health conditions, and level of func-
tional limitation), agency characteristics(number of registered nurses, physical therapists, and home health aides and facility-based status),
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and seasonality. Equations are estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors shown
in parenthesis are clustered on hospital referral region.
*p≤0.1, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.0169
Table 3.3:
The Influence of Other Agencies in the Chain on Existing Individual Agency’s
Home Health Service Provision Practice
Average Home Health Provision
of Other Agencies in the Chain
in Year t− 1
(1)For-Profit (2)Non-Profit
Pr(Recertified) .26 ∗ ∗∗ .033
(.033) (.054)
Pr(10≤V T≤13) .055 ∗ ∗ −.014
(.024) (.026)
Pr(7≤V T≤9) .028 .025
(.028) (.031)
Pr(V≤4) .048 ∗ ∗∗ .037
(.013) (.033)
Note: I ran all regressions, separately by agency owner-
ship type. Other control variables include patient char-
acteristics (age, race, gender, participation in Medicare
Buy-in Program, prior hospitalization or nursing home
stay, major health conditions, and level of functional
limitation), agency characteristics(number of registered
nurses, physical therapists, and home health aides
and facility-based status), Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex, and seasonality. Equations are estimated using
an ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors





EFFECTS OF THE MEDICARE HOME HEALTH
OUTLIER PAYMENT POLICY ON OLDER ADULTS
WITH DIABETES
4.1 Introduction
Medicare home health care has been struggling to find a reimbursement system that
achieves a seemingly self-contradictory goal: providing high quality care while minimizing
costs. This struggle is exemplified by the 2010 introduction of the 10 percent per-agency
cap on outlier payments, which restricts total outlier payments for each home health agency
to no more than 10 percent of that agency’s total annual prospective payments from Medi-
care.
The Medicare home health prospective payment system provides fixed payments for
each patient, based on patient health condition at the time of admission to home health
care. Unfortunately, this can discourage home health agencies from serving high-cost pa-
tients whose treatment costs exceed prospective payment rates. To address this problem,
Medicare makes outlier payments in addition to prospective payments when a patient re-
quires too many home health visits and incurs high costs. However, some agencies ma-
nipulated these outlier payments that increased the marginal benefit of home health visits
from zero to positive. Those agencies intentionally increased the number of patients eli-
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gible for outlier payments and provided excessive numbers of home health visits for those
outlier patients. This led Medicare to introduce the 10 percent per-agency cap on outlier
payments.
While the intention of this cap is to control excessively increasing outlier payments,
it might also produce undesirable incentives. In essence, the 10 percent cap can penalize
agencies that accept and treat clinically complex, and thus costly patients. These agencies
can be compelled to either drastically reduce the number of service visits for costly patients
or to drop the patients altogether. Some of the dropped patients can then move to other more
expensive health care, ultimately increasing total Medicare spending (CMS, 2009).
To address this issue, this study focuses on Medicare home health patients who had
diabetes with the need of insulin treatment and examines how those patients were affected
by the addition of the 10 percent cap to the Medicare home health prospective payment
system. My analysis uses the Medicare Home Health Claim and Provider of Service File
of 2008-2010. To identify the influence of the 10 percent cap, I utilize agency variation
in the proportion of outlier payments: only agencies that had outlier payments close to or
higher than 10 percent would have faced incentives to decrease outlier payments after the
implementation of the 10 percent cap.
Using this identification strategy, this study finds that the 10 percent cap compelled
agencies to decrease the number of home health visits for outlier patients if agencies’ pro-
portion of outlier payments was close to or beyond the 10 percent cap prior to the imple-
mentation of the policy. In particular, the decrease in the number of service visits was
greater among relatively healthy patients, and vice versa. The 10 percent cap also influ-
enced an agency’s decision on the type of patients to treat. That is, agencies dropped the
most and the least healthy outlier patients in response to the 10 percent cap. Many healthiest
patients were discontinued from home health care because their agencies, with an incentive
to decrease outlier payments, determined their outlier patients healthy enough for self-care
and dropped them. Agencies also dropped the sickest patients, who greatly contribute to
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the increase in outlier payments, and sent them to more costly health care settings such as
nursing homes and hospitals.
These findings suggest that the 10 percent cap decreased outlier payments and thus
saved Medicare home health spending as intended. However, this policy pushed some
home health patients to more expensive health care settings. In addition, the reduction in
the number of home health visits among home health patients might lead to a faster decline
in patients’ health outcomes in the long run. I therefore conclude the net effect of 10 percent
cap on total health spending is ambiguous.
4.2 10 Percent Cap on Outlier Payment
In an effort to reduce costs, the Medicare home health prospective payment system
provides fixed reimbursement per patient based on each patient’s health status. Each pa-
tient is sorted into one of many payment groups, and agencies receive the pre-determined
reimbursement amount that corresponds with that group, regardless of the incurred ex-
penditure on patients. Unfortunately, this policy discourages home health agencies from
treating high-cost patients whose treatment costs would most likely exceed the reimburse-
ment amounts. Thus, certain patient populations might struggle to receive the quantity and
quality of care they have required.
To address this problem, Medicare introduced ’outlier payments’ to its prospective pay-
ment system. That is, if a patient’s episode incurs an unusually high cost and thus his esti-
mated cost exceeds a threshold amount, the patient becomes eligible for outlier payments
and then the patient’s agency receives an extra payment (i.e. outlier payment) in addition
to the regular prospective payment (See Table 4.1 for more specific information about the
calculation of outlier payments) (HCFA, 2000). The outlier payment amount is set as a
proportion (80 percent) of estimated cost beyond the threshold amount. Agencies may find
outlier payments attractive, because the marginal benefit of one visit increases from zero to
positive once their patients qualify for outlier payments. Therefore, outlier payments might
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encourage agencies to provide extra service visits for patients whose estimated treatment
costs are high enough in order to make them eligible for outlier payments (HCFA, 2000;
MedPAC, 2011). Agencies might also want to increase the number of service visits as
much as possible for each patient eligible for outlier payments.
In fact, many home health agencies manipulated outlier payments, and as a result there
has been a dramatic rise in outlier payments in a few counties. For example, in 2008, 52
percent of all outlier payments nationwide were made to agencies in one county, Miami-
Dade in Florida, where only 2 percent of all home health patients resided. In the same
year, 23 other counties exhibited similar outlier payment patterns to that of Miami-Dade
County (MedPAC, 2010; OIG, 2009). Government policy has taken a few actions to deal
with these fraud issues, such as curtailing fraudulent payments for agencies whose claims
for outlier payments seemed implausibly high. The government has also increased the
threshold amount. However, adjusting the threshold amount failed to curb rising outlier
payments and was perceived to be inappropriate, because all agencies, not just those sus-
pected of fraud, were penalized (CMS, 2009; MedPAC, 2010).
As a result, in 2010, the government implemented an agency-level outlier cap, such that
in any given year, an individual agency would receive no more than 10 percent of its total
home health reimbursement in outlier payments. In other words, if a claim with an outlier
payment causes an agency to exceed the 10 percent cap, then Medicare would not make the
outlier payment of the claim (CMS, 2009). The government expected that the 10 percent
cap would diminish agencies’ incentives to provide unnecessary services. The reduction
in aggregate outlier payments created by the 10 percent cap would be transferred to aggre-
gate prospective payments, causing the standard prospective payment rate to increase, and
thus benefiting agencies serving home health patients with moderate health needs (CMS,
2009). Thus, the intention behind the 10 percent cap was to shift resources from fraudulent
agencies to non-fraudulent agencies.
However, the 10 percent cap could penalize agencies that legitimately served costly
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patients and therefore could affect the care for expensive patients. One group of patients
potentially affected by the 10 percent cap are those with diabetes who need daily injec-
tions of insulin and thus greatly rely on home health care to lead independent lives. Many
patients with diabetes cannot safely administer their insulin because they have visual, cog-
nitive, or dexterity impairments. If such patients do not have access to informal caregivers,
then they must rely on home health visits that provide daily diabetic management. This
makes them extremely costly outlier patients. Without home health care insulin manage-
ment, however, these patients cannot live independently and might end up relying on more
expensive health care services, such as skilled nursing homes or inpatient care services
(CMS, 2009).
I have located only one study (Litchman, 2010) that investigated the effects of the 10
percent cap. Using descriptive statistics from her clinic’s patients with type 1 diabetes
(N=97), she concludes that the cap compelled her clinic to reduce the amount of care for
61 percent of patients and discharge seven percent of patients to nursing homes.This study
also examines the effects of the 10 percent cap but goes beyond Litchman’s study in several
aspects. First, rather than looking at one clinic’s responses to the 10 percent cap in 2010, I
exploit prior year agency-level variation in the proportion of outlier payments and identify
the effect of the cap in 2010. Second, I also explore how the degree of the effect varied
depending on patient’s severity of functional disability. Third, I use the nationally repre-
sentative sample containing five percent of all Medicare home health patients. Fourth, I
include not only type 1 but also type 2 diabetes patients who needed insulin injection in my
sample. Type 2 patients account for the majority(90-95 percent) of diabetes patients and
many of them require insulin injections like type 1 diabetes patients (American Diabetes
Association, 2006). Home health patients with type 2 diabetes could be effected by the 10
percent cap to the same degree if they needed insulin injection. Thus, excluding them from
the sample could be glaring omission.
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4.3 Expected Effects of the 10 Percent Cap on Diabetes Patients With
the Need of Insulin Injection
This section explains how agencies have adjusted care for diabetic patients who need
insulin injections (hereafter called diabetes patients) in response to the 10 percent cap.
On average, the 10 percent cap would influence home health services for diabetes pa-
tients more strongly than for non-diabetes patients. Diabetes patients tend to require a
high number of visits due to their need for daily insulin injections, and thus they are more
likely to be eligible for outlier payments. For example, in 2008 Medicare made outlier
payments for 39 percent of episodes for diabetes patients, while the corresponding number
for non-diabetes patients was less than 3 percent. However, not all diabetes patients would
be influenced by the 10 percent cap. Their care would be affected only when their agency’s
proportion of outlier payments was close to or beyond the 10 percent cap prior to the imple-
mentation of the policy. In other words, if the agency’s proportion of outlier payments was
far below 10 percent, the 10 percent cap would have no effect on care for diabetes patients.
The pressure to adjust care for diabetes patients within each agency would increase with
the level of outlier payments, if higher than 10 percent.
In particular, the 10 percent cap would affect an agency’s decisions in two respects:
the number of service visits to provide per episode for a patient of a given severity level
(intensive margin) and the types of patients to serve, assuming patient heterogeneity in
severity of illness (extensive margin).
First, agencies would decrease the number of home health visits for outlier diabetes
patients in response to the 10 percent cap. Without the 10 percent cap in place, agencies,
with the goal of profit maximization, would increase the number of service visits as much
as possible in order to take advantage of a positive marginal value of one visit among outlier
patients. Under the 10 percent cap, however, agencies would be compelled to keep their
proportion of outlier payments under 10 percent. Otherwise, they would have to bear the
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full cost of extra treatments beyond the 10 percent cap. Therefore, if an agency’s outlier
payments exceeded the 10 percent cap in prior years, the agency would face pressure to
reduce the number of visits for outlier episodes. This reduction in the number of visits
could either make a patient no longer eligible for outlier payments or allow them to remain
eligible for outlier payments while receiving fewer service visits than before.
Notably, not all diabetes patients would experience the same level of decrease in service
visits. That is, the adjustment in the number of visits would vary based on a patient’s
health status. Agencies would decrease the number of visits to a greater degree among
mildly disabled patients, and vice versa. This is because agencies assume that, on average,
healthier patients would be less affected by the decrease in the amount of care.
Second, the 10 percent cap would affect agencies’ decisions regarding the types of
patients to serve. Agencies will most likely drop patients at both ends of the illness severity
spectrum, the most and the least healthy patients, and mainly serve patients with a moderate
level of illness. Healthier patients would be more likely to be discontinued from home
health care because they are expected to be more capable of taking care of themselves
without home health care, as compared to patients with more severe diabetes. On the
other end of the spectrum, the sickest patients tend to require an extremely high number
of visits, and thus greatly contribute to the increase in total outlier payments. However, as
discussed above, it would be challenging to decrease the number of visits for sicker patients
because even a small reduction in the amount of care could lead to a significant decline in
their health. To avoid these high-cost patients, agencies could either send them to nursing
homes or hospitals or transfer them to other agencies that have not met the 10 percent cap.
These expected reactions from home health agencies under the 10 percent cap illustrate
how hard it is to contain the rising cost of health care. The 10 percent cap will decrease
outlier payments and save Medicare home health spending. However, this policy may push
sicker home health patients to other, more expensive health care settings, such as nursing
homes or hospitals. In addition, patients who receive a significantly reduced number of
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home health visits may experience a faster decline in their health and use more costly
health services in the long run. These results will ultimately increase total health spending,
and this increase could be greater than the immediate savings realized under the 10 percent
cap.
Based on this conceptual framework, this paper examines the following two hypotheses.
First, the 10 percent cap reduced the number of service visits for diabetes patients if an
agency’s proportion of outlier payments was close to or beyond the 10 percent cap in prior
years. Second, the 10 percent cap affected agency decisions regarding which types of
patients to treat if an agency’s proportion of outlier payments was close to or beyond the
10 percent cap in prior years. Third, the effect of the 10 percent cap described in the first
and second hypothesis was stronger for the healthiest and sickest patients.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Datasets
Data on each home health patient’s demographic and home health service use is from 1)
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 5% Limited Data Set-Denominator
File from 2008 to 2010 and 2) the CMS 5% Limited Data Set-Home Health Agency File
from 2008 to 2010. I use data from 2008 through 2010 because Medicare partially revised
its home health reimbursement system in 2008. The first dataset, which was extracted from
Medicare claims, is a panel of five percent of Medicare beneficiaries and contains their
basic demographic information such as age, race, gender, and date of death, as well as
Medicare HMO enrollment status. The second dataset, which was also taken from Medi-
care claims, is also a panel of five percent of Medicare home health patients and contains
administrative information about each patient’s health condition and home health service
use (CMS, 2012). I combine the first two datasets using each beneficiary’s ID number, and
create a complete Medicare claim dataset.
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I obtain each home health agency characteristics from 3) the CMS Provider of Service
File-Home Health Agency from 2008 to 2010. This dataset was extracted from the Online
Survey and Certification Reporting System/ Quality Improvement Evaluation System col-
lected by the CMS Regional Offices (Choi & Davitt, 2009; CMS, 2012). It is a panel of
all Medicare/Medicaid-certified home health agencies across the nation and includes their
basic agency information like location, ownership type, and date of initial Medicare cer-
tification. The home health agency provider number enables me to merge the combined
Medicare claim dataset and CMS Provider of Service File, resulting in a patient-agency
linked, unbalanced panel data set. Each observation in this dataset corresponds to a pa-
tient’s unique episode of care.
My dataset collects five percent of Medicare home health episodes, which may not
be representative at an agency level. In other words, the proportion of outlier payments
for each agency in the five percent dataset is likely different from the actual proportion.
However, the comparison between my dataset and results in the OIG report (2012) that
used the 100 percent of Medicare home health claims justifies the use of my dataset for
the analysis. For example, 6.69 percent agencies (647 out of 9,665 agencies) in my dataset
had outlier payments over the 10 percent cap in 2010, which is close to the corresponding
number in the OIG report, 4.21 percent agencies (434 out of 10,316 agencies). Technically,
no agencies should have outlier payments exceeding the 10 percent cap in 2010 when the 10
percent cap was implemented, but in 2010, the 10 percent cap on the total outlier payments
was not enforced properly.
4.4.2 Change in Each Agency’s Proportion of Outlier Payments between 2008 and
2010
As discussed above, in 2010, Medicare did not enforce the 10 percent cap on total
outlier payments properly and more than 600 agencies had higher than 10 percent outlier
payments (See Figure 4.1). Nevertheless, the cap had decreased the fraction of agencies
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with an extremely high proportion of outlier payments. For example, the percentage of
agencies with outlier payments higher than 40 percent decreased from 3.07 percent in 2008
to 0.15 percent in 2010. Probably, these agencies with an extremely high proportion of
outlier payments prior to 2010 were not able to decrease the proportion to below 10 percent
because it might be hard to drastically cut down outlier episodes in one or two years. As
a result, the percentage of agencies with 10-40 percent outlier payments stayed almost the
same, from 6.34 percent in 2008 to 6.56 percent in 2010.
4.4.3 Diabetes Patients with the Need of Insulin Injection
I identify diabetes patients with the need of insulin injection (termed as ’diabetes pa-
tients’ hereafter) as those assigned with two ICD-9-CM codes: 250- Diabetes Mellitus and
V58.67- Long-term (current) use of insulin. This group of patients accounted for 2.60, 2.75,
and 2.74 percent of Medicare home health patients in 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively.
Medicare home health patients with diabetes and need of insulin injection were different
from the rest of home health patients in demographic characteristics, health conditions,
home health service use. Also, agencies that served them had different characteristics from
those that did not (See Table 4.2). In particular, for this examination, I choose the 2008
data because the 10 percent cap on outlier payments possibly influenced diabetes patients’
profile, home health service utilization pattern, and home health agency in 2010.
On average, diabetes patients were more likely to be young, male, and non-white. They
were also more likely to participate in a Medicare Buy-in Program. This indicates that
diabetes home health patients tended to be low-income given that the program helps low-
income Medicare beneficiaries pay Medicare premiums (Families USA, 1999). Diabetes
patients tended to have a worse health condition: on average, they had a higher score on
the clinical and functional severity index (1-3) at the start of each episode of care. Diabetes
patients were much less likely to have inpatient or skilled nursing home stay prior to the
admission to home health care.
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A diabetes patient’s home health service use was more intense. Each had a much higher
number of home health visits (mostly skilled nursing visits) per episode, 58.43 visits, while
other home health patients had 18 visits. Due to their high number of service visits, diabetes
patients were more likely to be eligible for outlier payments. 39.05 percent of diabetes
patients’ episodes received outlier payments whereas the corresponding number for the
rest of the patients was only 2.62 percent.
Agencies that served diabetes patients had different characteristics from those that did
not. They were more likely to be for-profits, free-standing, and serve a smaller number of
home health episodes. Their average proportion of outlier payments out of total prospective
payments was 14.31 percent, which was much higher than 2.44 percent, the corresponding
number of agencies that did not serve diabetes patients.
4.5 Empirical Strategy
If a diabetes patient with outlier payments was served by an agency that had outlier
payments higher than 10 percent of total home health prospective payments, then the patient
would have experienced a more drastic decrease in their home health service visits in 2010.
The 10 percent cap might also compel agencies to drop diabetes patients, and as a result, the
dropped patients might enter a nursing home or a hospital, be transferred to other agencies,
or be discontinued from home health care without receiving any types of formal health
services for their insulin injection.
To address these hypotheses, I exploit agency-level variation in the proportion of outlier
payments to identify the effect of the 10 percent cap on each patient’s home health service
use and discharge status. For this empirical analysis, I create a measure of each agency’s
proportion of outlier payments at a base year. The base year is year 2008 for an agency
that served any episodes in 2008, and is year 2009 for an agency that served episodes in
2009, but none in 2008. I drop agencies who had episodes only in 2010. I then create
four dummy variables from each agency’s proportion of outlier payments at a base year:
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they indicate whether each agency’s total outlier payments accounted for 0-7 percent, 7-10
percent, 10-40 percent, or more than 40 percent of total prospective payments at a base
year. I interact these variables with year dummy variables. I consider these interactions
because a diabetes patient would have experienced a more drastic change in home health
use in 2010 if the patient was served by an agency that had outlier payments higher than or
close to 10 percent of total home health prospective payments at a base year.
I limit my sample to diabetes patients and then estimate the equation (4.1) to understand
the effect of the 10 percent cap on each patient’s care. In particular, the dependent variable,
Yijkt, in the equation (4.1) reflects the different aspects of care for each patient, including
each patient’s 1) likelihood of being eligible for outlier payments, 2) number of service
visits per episode, and 3) discharge status at the end of each episode (i.e., discontinuation
from home health care, hospitalization, nursing home entry, and transfer to another agency.










j × Y eart
+ Agencyjtδ + Patientijktγ + Seasonalityktθ + Statesϑ+ εijkt (4.1)
where i, j, k, and t refer to a patient, agency, episode, and year. Propaj is a set of dummy
variables indicating whether an agency j’s total outlier payments were 7-10 percent, 10-40
percent, or more than 40 percent of total prospective payments at a base year. Y eart refers
to the year dummy variables with the omitted group of year 2008. Agencyjt represents each
agency’s basic characteristics including ownership type (for-profit or non-profit), annual
number of episodes served by each agency, and facility-based status. Patientijkt denotes
each patient’s basic characteristics including age, gender, race/ethnicity, participation in the
Medicare buy-in program, clinical severity, functional severity, and an indicator whether
each patient stayed in either a hospital or skilled nursing home prior to a home health
admission. I also control for Seasonalitykt, an indicator variable for the first (reference
82
group), second, third, and last quarter of each year. I include state fixed effects States
because each state might have different regulations including certificate of need program
for home health care-which regulates the entry of new home health agencies to the market-
and Medicaid home and community based care program-which provides home health care
at the expense of Medicaid. All of these regulations can differently influence Medicare
home health service provision across states. The parameters of interest, β3at measure how
the outcome differs in year t compared to the base year depending on which group (a)
each agency belonged to at the base year. β3at is expected to be significant if an agency’s
proportion of outlier payments was close to or beyond the 10 percent cap at the base year.
In order to examine how each patient’s health condition influenced the number of visits
and discharge status, I also run my regression including the three-way interaction terms be-
tween year dummy variables, the measure of each agency’s proportion of outlier payments,
and the measure of each patient’s level of functional disability (with a range of 1(low) to
3(high)). This specification takes the following form:




























j × Y eart × Function
f
ijkt + Agencyjtδ
+ Patientijktγ + Seasonalityktθ + Statesϑ+ εijkt (4.2)
In particular, I estimate separate linear probability models for each dependent variable.
In fact, all results are essentially the same if I estimate probit models instead. However, I
prefer the individual OLS results due to the more straightforward inference with the inter-
action term estimates. Standard errors are clustered on home health agency.
The critical identifying assumption of my empirical strategy is that there were no dif-
ferential trends between agencies that had low and high proportion of outlier payments.
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In other words, the correlation between each agency’s proportion of outlier payments and
unobserved factors of each patient’s home health service use and discharge status did not
change contemporaneously with the implementation of the 10 percent cap.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Effect on the Number of Home Health Service Visits
Diabetes patients experienced greater declines in the number of home health visits be-
tween 2008 and 2010 if they were served by agencies whose proportion of outlier payments
was close to or beyond the 10 percent in a baseline year. Due to the decreased number of
visits, diabetes patients were much less likely to be eligible for outlier payments in 2010.
In 2008, if a patient was served by agencies with 10-40 percent (hereafter termed 10-40%)
and 40 percent and higher percentage (hereafter termed ≥40%) of outlier payments, then
the patient’s likelihood of being eligible for outlier payments was higher by 62 and 73 per-
centage points, respectively, compared to patients of agencies with 0-7 percent (hereafter
termed 0-7%) of outlier payments. This discrepancy decreased to 42 and 52 percentage
points in 2010 due to the implementation of the 10 percent cap (see Table 4.3, Column (1)).
Even if patients remained eligible for outlier payments, the 10 percent cap caused agen-
cies to decrease the number of service visits drastically. In 2008, patients whose agency
had 7-10%, 10-40% , and ≥40% of outlier payments, received 13, 38, and 70 more visits
per episode, respectively, compared to patients served by an agency with 0-7% of outlier
payments. This pattern reversed in 2010. When outlier patients were served by agencies
with 7-10% of outlier payments, there were 17 fewer visits. Those served by agencies with
10-40% received 3 fewer visits, as compared to patients served by agencies with 0-7% of
outlier payments. Patients with agencies with ≥40% of outlier payments received only 3
more visits, which is a drastic decrease from 70 more visits in 2008 (see Table 4.3, Column
(2)).
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The regression results indicate that agencies with 10 or higher percent of outlier pay-
ments started to decrease the number of visits in 2009 (see Table 4.3, Column (2)). This
might be because the finalized rule of the 10 percent cap was announced in November,
2009. If agencies were at risk of having the proportion of outlier payments over or near
the 10 percent level in 2009, they would have started to adjust service provision practices
starting at that time.
As a robustness check, I examine the number of service visits for non-outlier diabetes
patients, but I do not find the same pattern of service number decreases among this pop-
ulation. This reconfirms my finding that the big decrease in the number of visits among
diabetes patients in 2010 was exclusively due to the 10 percent cap.
Agencies’ adjustments to the number of visits varied based on each patient’s level of
functional disability. Severely disabled patients experienced the smallest decrease under
the 10 percent cap: outlier patients with a score of two or three on the functional disability
index did receive a decreased number of visits, but the decrease was smaller by 23 and 37
visits, respectively, compared to the decrease experienced by mildly disabled patients with
a score of one on the index (see Table 4.4, Column (2)).
Common sense suggests that the adjustment of the number of visits depending on each
patient’s level of functional disability should be stronger among agencies with a higher
percentage of outlier payments. However, the adjustment was strong only among agencies
with 10-40% of outlier payments, not the ones with ≥40% (Table 4.4, Column (2)). One
possible explanation for this unexpected finding is that agencies with an extremely high
proportion of outlier payments might just choose to drop severely disabled patients instead
of decreasing the number of visits for them. Actually, I find that agencies with ≥40% of
outlier payments were more likely to send their patients to a nursing home if these patients
had a high level of functional disability, which will be discussed more in detail in the next
section (see Table 4.6, Column (2)).
Surprisingly, the data shows that each patient’s level of functional disability had no
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effect on the likelihood of being eligible for outlier payments between 2008 and 2010 (see
Table 4.4, Column (1)).
4.6.2 Effect on the Types of Patients
The 10 percent cap affected a diabetes patient’s discharge status in three ways. First, di-
abetes patients were more likely to be discontinued from home health care without entering
a nursing home or seeking inpatient care under the 10 percent cap. In 2008, an agency with
10-40% and ≥40% of outlier payments were less likely to discontinue their patients from
home health care, as compared to an agency with 0-7% of outlier payments. In 2010, those
agencies’ tendency to discontinue their patients from home health care was still lower, but
the discrepancy between them and those agencies with 0-7% decreased by roughly 6.10
and 7.49 percentage points, respectively (Table 4.5, Column (1)).
In particular, I find that mildly disabled patients experienced more discontinuation:
patients with a score of one on the functional disability index, were more likely to stop
receiving home health care, compared to those with a score of three (see Table 4.6, Column
(1)). This suggests that agencies might find it easier to discontinue care from relatively
healthy patients who are more likely to be able to manage their insulin injections by them-
selves. These findings suggest that home health services might be partially valued on the
margin by those discontinued patients, and therefore, the 10 percent cap might improve the
efficiency of home health services as intended. However, it is uncertain how the discontin-
uation from home health care affects a diabetes patient’s health conditions and use of other
health services in the long-run.
Under the 10 percent cap, a patient was more likely to leave home health care and
instead enter a nursing home (see Table 4.5, Column (2)). The likelihood of entering a
nursing home further increased for severely disabled patients with a score of three on the
functional disability index (see Table 4.6, Column (2)). The third effect of the 10 percent
cap was that each patient was more likely to get readmitted to a hospital under this cap
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(see Table 4.5, Column (3)). There are two possible explanations for these findings. For
instance, agencies found it challenging to dramatically decrease the number of visits for
patients and instead determined to send them to nursing homes or hospitals in order to
avoid high cost patients. Another possible explanation is that the dramatic drop in the
number of service visits under the 10 percent cap might cause a decline in patients’ health,
leading patients to nursing home entry or hospitalization.
This finding that some home health patients moved to a more expensive health care
setting such as a nursing home or inpatient care indicates that the 10 percent cap had a
spillover effect on other types of health care. This presents the possibility that the 10
percent cap might ultimately increase total health care spending despite its contributing to
the decrease in Medicare home health spending.
Lastly, a patient’s likelihood of being transferred to another agency was not affected by
the 10 percent cap (see Table 4.5, Column (4)).
4.7 Discussion
This study finds that the 10 percent cap dramatically decreased the number of service
visits for diabetes patients. In particular, patients with a lower level of functional disability
experienced the decrease to a greater degree. I also find the 10 percent cap affected an
agency’s decision on which types of patients to treat. On average, healthier outlier patients
were more likely to be determined healthy enough and be discontinued from home health
care without receiving any other types of formal health services. This finding, along with
the drastic reduction in the number of service visits seems to suggest that the 10 percent
cap might improve the efficiency of home health services as intended. However, I also
find that the 10 percent cap pushed patients to use more expensive health services, such as
nursing homes or inpatient care, which presents the possibility that the 10 percent cap might
ultimately increase total health care spending. Moreover, due to the limited availability of
the data, I was able to examine only one year after the implementation of the 10 percent
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cap. Given that it might take a relatively long time for a patient’s health status to be affected
by the decreased number of visits or discontinuation from home health care, it is not yet
clear how the 10 percent cap would affect a diabetes patient’s health condition and use of
other health services in the long-run.
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of Outlier Payments between 2008 and 2010
Note: In 2010, Medicare did not enforce the 10 percent cap on total outlier payments properly and more than
600 agencies had higher than 10 percent outlier payments.
Table 4.1: Calculation of Outlier Payment
If estimate cost > threshold amount, then outlier payment >0
If estimate cost ≤ threshold amount, then outlier payment =0
1) Estimate cost is standard per-visit payment rate by service type multi-
plied by the number of visits by service type.
2) Threshold amount is the sum of prospective payment amount for each pa-
tient’s payment group and fixed dollar loss amount; fixed dollar loss amount
is set as standard prospective payment rate multiplied by fixed dollar loss
ratio; CMS updates fixed dollar loss ratio each year, 0.65 in 2008, 0.89 in
2009, and 0.89 in 2010.
3) Outlier payment amount is 80 percent of the difference between esti-
mated cost and threshold amount.
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Table 4.2:
Patients with/without Diabetes and Use of Insulin in 2008: Patient’s Demo-
graphic Characteristics, Health Conditions, and Home Health Service Use and
Agency’s Characteristics
Patients with Diabetes Patients without Diabetes
Characteristics and Use of Insulin and Use of Insulin
Demographic Factors
Age 72.52(.25) 77.07(.031)***
Female (%) 57.07(1.09) 63.49(.13) ***
Race
White (%) 82.29(.84) 93.59(.069)***
Black (%) 17.37(.83) 6.25(0.068)***
Others (%) 0.34(12.71) 0.16 (.011)***
Participation in
Medicare Buy-in Program (%) 44.18(1.090) 25.75(11.72)***
Observations (# Patients) 2,078 127,851
Episodes with Diabetes Episodes without Diabetes
and Use of Insulin and Use of Insulin
Health Condition in Each Episode
Acute Care prior to
Home Health Care (%) 15.31(4.76) 28.87(.094) ***
Clinical Severity
1 (%) 2.01(.19) 20.63(.084)***
2 (%) 32.15(.62) 35.15(.099)***
3 (%) 65.8634(.74) 44.22(.10) ***
Functional Severity
1 (%) 28.46(.60) 28.46(.093)
2 (%) 51.15(.66) 51.26(.10)***
3 (%) 18.38(.51) 20.28(.083)***
Service Use in Each Episode
Pr(Outlier)(%) 39.05(.64) 2.62(.033)***
Number of Visits 58.43(.82) 18.20(.041)***
Agency Characteristics
Ownership (%)
For-Profit (%) 76.55(.56) 62.07(.10)***
Non-Profit (%) 20.01(.53) 33.51(.098)***
Government (%) 3.44(.24) 4.41(.042)***
Facility-Based (%) 10.94(.41) 16.94(.078)***
Size 101.01(2.57) 135.00(.61)***
Proportion of
Outlier Payments (%) 14.31(.24) 2.44(.015)***
Observations (# Episodes) 5,723 233,952
Notes: Percentages are shown for categorical variables; means are shown for continuous variables
with standard errors in parenthese.
*p≤0.1, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01 for t-test.
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Table 4.3: The Influence of 10 Percent Cap on the Intensity of Service Visits
(1) (2)


















Notes: Equations are estimated using an ordinary least squares regression.
Standard errors are clustered on home health agency. Other control vari-
ables include 1) agency’s characteristics including ownership type, annual
number of episodes served by each agency, and facility-based status, 2) each
patient’s characteristics including age, gender, race/ethnicity, participation
in the Medicare buy-in program, clinical severity, functional severity, and





The Influence of 10 Percent Cap on the Intensity of Service Visits by Patient’s
Level of Functional Disabiltiy
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Notes: Equations are estimated using an ordinary least squares regression.
Standard errors are clustered on home health agency. Other control vari-
ables include 1) agency’s characteristics including ownership type, annual
number of episodes served by each agency, and facility-based status, 2) each
patient’s characteristics including age, gender, race/ethnicity, participation
in the Medicare buy-in program, clinical severity, functional severity, and




Table 4.5: The Influence of 10 Percent Cap on the Discharge Status at the End of Each Episode
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate Pr(Stop) Pr(Nursing Home) Pr(Hospital) Pr(Transfer)
Year
2009 .0019(.012) -.0029(.0021) -.015(.0041)*** .00045(.0042)
2010 .0096(.012) -.0038(.0020)* -.011(.0042)*** -.00036(.0042)
Proportion of Outlier Payments
Prop0.07 -.054(.061) .0085(.0022)*** -.023(.011)** .013(.021)
Prop0.1 -.19(.018)*** -.0032(.0025) -.0095(.0067) -.010(.0062) )
Prop0.4 -.25(.021)*** -.0056(.0022)*** -.026(.0075)*** .0084(.010)
Year ×
Proportion of Outlier Payments
2009×Prop0.07 -.075(.072) .011(.0091) .031(.019) -.017(.023)
2010×Prop0.07 -.15(.057)** .026(.016) .034(.017)** -.018(.032)
2009×Prop0.1 .0078(.017) .0022(.0031) .011(.0077) .0028(.0078)
2010×Prop0.1 .061(.021)*** .0074(.0037)** .012(.0082) .0065(.0083)
2009×Prop0.4 .0081(.019) .0034(.0022) .013(.0062)** -.0077(.012)
2010×Prop0.4 .075(.027)*** .0049(.0028)* .022(.010)** .0068(.015)
R-squared .21 .0072 .15 .18
Observations 19,251 19,251 19,251 19,251
Notes: Equations are estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. Stan-
dard errors are clustered on home health agency. Other control variables include
1) agency’s characteristics including ownership type (for-profit-reference group, non-
profit, and government ownership), the annual number of patients served by each agency,
and facility-based status and 2) each patient’s characteristics including age, gender,





The Influence of 10 Percent Cap on the Discharge Status at the End of Each Episode by Patient’s Level of Functional Disability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariate Pr(Stop) Pr(Nursing Home) Pr(Hospital) Pr(Transfer)
Year ×
Proportion of Outlier Payments
2009×Prop0.1 .035(.031) .00075(.0050) .0099(.013) -.013(.015)
2010×Prop0.1 .090(.040)** .0015(.0056) .0081(.013) .00012(.015)
2009×Prop0.4 .036(.036) .0013(.0030) .011(.010) -.053(.026)**
2010×Prop0.4 .19(.068)*** .00025(.0029) .063(.031)** .014(.040)
Year ×
Proportion of Outlier Payments ×
Patient Health
2009×Prop0.1×FS2 -.024(.037) -.00091(.0066) -.0085(.015) .020(.017)
2009×Prop0.1×FS3 -.092(.051)* .010(.010) .031(.022) .025(.022)
2010×Prop0.1×FS2 -.0056(.049) .0018(.0072) .00083(.016) -.0018(.018)
2010×Prop0.1×FS3 -.15(.059)** .028(.015)* .014(.024) .042(.028)
2009×Prop0.4×FS2 -.038(.042) -.00085(.0042) -.0045(.013) .064(.030)**
2009×Prop0.4×FS3 -.044(.055) .013(.0071)* .025(.022) .024(.036)
2010×Prop0.4×FS2 -.11(.075) .0013(.0040) -.045(.034) .00091(.046)
2010×Prop0.4×FS3 -.24(.082)*** .021(.011)* -.065(.037)* -.038(.047)
R-squared .22 .0090 .012 .011
Observations 19,251 19,251 19,251 19,251
Notes: Equations are estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors are clus-
tered on home health agency. Other control variables include 1) agency’s characteristics including
ownership type (for-profit-reference group, non-profit, and government ownership), the annual num-
ber of patients served by each agency, and facility-based status and 2) each patient’s characteristics






5.1 Implication for Health Care Policy
This dissertation regarding home health agencies’ responses to the PPS provides impli-
cations for health care policy. First, Medicare home health patients bear no responsibility
for cost, which contributed to the Medicare home health spending growth under the PPS.
The first study shows that home health agencies increased the number of patients, the du-
ration of care per patient, and payment amounts per episode, not necessarily corresponding
to patients’ need, to increase profits under the PPS. To make matters worse, the overprovi-
sion of services was also welcomed by patients because their out-of-pocket cost was zero.
This further spurred home health spending. If home health patients had been responsible
for even a small amount of deductibles or copayments, the increase in total spending might
have been lower.
Second, new home health agencies’ entry to the market under the PPS also contributed
to the Medicare home health spending growth. Therefore, the Certificate of Need (CON)
program for home health care, which regulates the entry of new agencies, might have an
important implication for home health spending control. Both the first and second study
illustrate that a significant number of agencies entered the market under the PPS. Those
new agencies, mostly for-profits, responded to payment incentives in PPS to a greater de-
gree. Furthermore, these entries increased for-profit market share under the PPS, which
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in turn encouraged existing agencies to adopt profitable service provision patterns. Given
this situation, if all states had implemented CON for home health care, the total spending
increase might have been slower.
Third, for-profit agencies were much more responsive to financial incentives embedded
in the PPS as compared to non-profit agencies, and therefore for-profits played a main
role in home health spending under the PPS. This suggests that the government should
pay more attention to for-profit agencies’ response to payment incentives. At the same
time, government can develop a payment system that would minimize for-profit agencies’
profit-seeking behaviors. For example,the government can avoid non-linear pricing (e.g.,
significant amount of extra payments at the tenth therapy visit) that can distort agencies’
incentive to provide the appropriate number of service visits.
Fourth, increased Medicare home health spending could be viewed as desirable. Medi-
care home health care holds the potential to create savings in total health spending because
of its substitutability with more costly health care services such as skilled nursing home
or inpatient care. For example, the third study finds that the 10 percent cap, which was
introduced to curb increasing outlier payments, pushed home health patients to a more
costly health care setting. This might ultimately increase total health care spending. There-
fore, policy makers should consider the spillover effect when they try to implement new
regulations in home health care.
5.2 Implication for Social Work Practice and Policy
In addition to health care policy implications, this dissertation provides implications
for social work practice and policy. This section discusses how findings from this research
could be incorporated into social workers’ practice and policy advocacy.
First, home health agencies’ response to the PPS, mainly discussed in the first study,
has directly influenced social workers at a home health care setting. That is, the PPS
significantly diminished the role of social workers in home health care. Social workers in a
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home health agency typically provide mental health services for patients or connect patients
with available social services in their community. Medicare has categorized these services
as medical social services. Despite the potential importance of medical social services in
patients’ health conditions, the PPS encouraged agencies to reduce the provision of medical
social services drastically. That is because PPS makes a fixed payment per episode for each
patient and does not compensate the provision of medical social service visits separately.
Furthermore, medical social service would not have an immediate and notable influence on
a patient’s health status unlike skilled nursing or therapy visits. Thus, agencies chose to
decrease the number of medical social service visits rather than skilled nursing or therapy
visits under the PPS.
However, medical social services can be essential to keep patients healthy in the long-
run. For instance, depressed home health patients may find it challenging to receive other
sources of mental health services except medical social services particularly because they
are home bound. Given the negative influence of untreated depression on a patient’s health,
providing medical social service visits for home health patients can prevent potential ad-
verse outcomes and furthermore might save total health spending. Therefore, social work-
ers can advocate a payment system that does not financially discourage home health agen-
cies from providing medical social services.
Second, social workers can advocate a home health patient’s right to receive a high
quality of care. All three studies in this dissertation suggest that agencies adjusted service
provision patterns in response to the payment incentives embedded in the PPS and this
might have a negative effect on a patient. For example, the third paper discusses how the
implementation of the 10 percent cap led to a significant reduction in the number of service
visits and sent some diabetes patients to either a nursing home or hospital. Social workers
can inform both patients and agencies of the potential consequences of agencies’ response
to the payment system, and help patients receive the appropriate level of care.
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5.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, this dissertation examines health care providers’ behavioral responses to
incentives built into payment systems. In particular, my dissertation focuses on the home
health care industry, and addresses how home health agencies have strategically navigated
the Medicare reimbursement system. The findings of this dissertation suggest that home
health agencies adjusted their service provision patterns responding to the payment incen-
tives, which influenced both the cost and quality of home health care. These research
findings can help the government design more sophisticated reimbursement systems that





A.1 Medicare Home Health Reimbursement Schedule
This section provides more detailed explanation about how a Medicare home health
care reimbursement schedule is determined. To illustrate an example of a home health re-
imbursement schedule, let’s imagine a patient who lived in Ann Arbor, MI in 2001 and
received physical therapy services from a home health agency. His home health agency
assessed his health status and assigned him to the case-mix group C1F1S0 (his clinical
severity was low; functional severity was low; and service severity was minimal). This
case-mix group was translated to a case-mix weight 0.7169 and its corresponding reim-
bursement amount $1,691.25 that had been adjusted according to the Ann Arbor wage in-
dex. The patient’s case-mix group stayed as C1F1S0 for his first 9 therapy visits. However,
once the number of therapy visits reached 10, his payment group automatically switched to
C1F1S2. That is, his service severity increased from minimal to moderate while his clinical
and functional severity stayed low. This new case-mix group pushed his case-mix weight
up to 1.6752 and his reimbursement amount to $3,951.98. This retrospective feature built
into the prospective reimbursement schedule provided a strong incentive for the patient’s
agency to provide at least 10 therapy visits such that it could make $2,260.73 ($3,951.98 -
$1,691.25) of additional revenue compared to 9 or fewer visits.
The Medicare home health reimbursement system contained further retrospective fea-
tures, low-cost and high-cost outlier payments. In terms of low-cost outlier payments, for
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patients who received 4 or fewer visits per episode, the CMS would make a per-visit low-
utilization payment by service type that was the same for all patients, regardless of health
status. Thus, in this patient case, if he received 4 or fewer physical therapy visits, his agency
would have received $116.81 for each visit instead of the lump-sum payment. In terms of
high-cost outlier payments, for patients who required more service visits such that their
estimated incurred per-episode cost exceeded a threshold amount, the CMS would make
a high-cost outlier payment equal to 80 percent of the estimated incurred per-episode cost
beyond the threshold amount. In John’s example, once his therapy visit number reached
57, John would become eligible for high-cost outlier payments. Thus, his agency would
receive an additional $93.45 for each therapy visit beyond visit 56 in addition to $3,951.98.
A.2 Control Variables
This section provides more specific explanation about the vector of control variables X
that refers to each patient and agency’s basic characteristics, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(the measure of level of market concentration), and seasonality.
Each patient’s basic characteristics include both demographic and health characteris-
tics. Demographic factors include age, race/ethnicity, gender, and an indicator of partici-
pation in the Medicare buy-in program. Participation in the Medicare buy-in program is a
proxy of being low-income given that the program helps pay Medicare premiums for low-
income Medicare beneficiaries (Families USA, 1999). Patient health conditions include
indicators for most frequent major health diagnoses (diabetes, hypertension, heart failure,
chronic ulcer of skin, osteoporosis, cardiac dysrhythmias, stroke, dementia, pneumonia,
other forms of chronic ischemic heart disease, cancer, mental disorders, arthritis).
Each home health agency’s basic characteristics include the number of patients treated
by each agency and an indicator of whether each agency was free-standing or facility-based.
Unfortunately, the dataset provides no variable that measures the number of patients in each
agency. Instead, I use the count of patients treated by each agency in the dataset as a proxy.
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Because the dataset samples 5% of all Medicare home health patients, the relative actual
number of patients across agencies should be consistent with the measure constructed from
my dataset. I also take into account whether each agency was free-standing or facility-
based. Facility-based agencies are operated as part of a hospital, rehabilitation facility, or
skilled nursing home. The distinction is important because facility-based agencies would
enjoy benefits unavailable to free-standing agencies such as referrals of more profitable
patients through the affiliated system and a more stable budget source (Choi & Davitt,
2009).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures level of market concentration. HHI
is calculated as the sum of the squares of each agency’s share of total episodes within
each Hospital Referral Region in each year, and thus it ranges between 0 and 1. A higher
value of HHI indicates a higher concentration of agencies, but less intense within market
competition.
Seasonality includes indicators of four quarter of each year (the firstreference group,
second, third, and last quarter of each year).
A.3 DFL decomposition
This section illustrates how the DFL method decomposes the change in the distribution
of the number of therapy visits between 2001 and 2007 (Dinardo, 2002; Fortin et al., 2011).
The actual distribution of the number of therapy visits in 2001 and 2007 is expressed as
followings, respectively.
∫
f 2001(V T )dV T ≡
∫
f 2001(V T |x)h(x|t = 2001)dx (A.1)
∫
f 2007(V T )dV T ≡
∫
f 2007(V T |x)h(x|t = 2007)dx (A.2)
where V T represents the number of therapy visits per episode, t refers to year, and x rep-
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resents other characteristics affecting the number of therapy visits including patient and
agency characteristics, seasonality, and state indicators. f 2001(V T |x) is the therapy visit
number determination mechanism in 2001 that maps observables to the number of ther-
apy visit distribution. The density h(x|t = 2001) is the probability density function of
observables in 2001.
I then decompose the difference between equations (A.1) and (A.2) :
∫
f 2007(V T )dV T −
∫
f 2001(V T )dV T = [
∫
f 2007(V T |x)h(x|t = 2007)dx
−
∫
f 2007(V T |x)h(x|t = 2001)dx]
+ [
∫
f 2007(V T |x)h(x|t = 2001)dx
−
∫
f 2001(V T |x)h(x|t = 2001)dx] (A.3)
is the counterfactual distribution which indicates what the distribution of the number of
therapy visits would be in 2001 if the therapy visit number determination mechanism was
the same as in 2007. Thus, the first two terms describe differences in the number of therapy
visits caused by the change in observables between 2001 and 2007, holding the therapy
visit number determination mechanism in 2007 fixed (composition effects). The last two
terms describe the difference in the number of therapy visits between 2001 and 2007 at-
tributable to the change in the therapy visit number determination mechanism between
2001 and 2007, holding the value of observables in 2001 fixed (structure effects). This
difference measures agencies’ adjustment in the number of therapy visits responding to
payment incentives, assuming that there were no omitted variables affecting the number of
therapy visits (Olson, 1998).
The DFL method computes the counterfactual distribution, weighting the actual distri-
bution of the 2007 with the following variable ωi.
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∫
f 2007(V T |x)h(x|t = 2001)dx ≡
∫
ωif






{Pr(t = 2001|x)i/Pr(t = 2001)}
{Pr(t = 2007|x)i/Pr(t = 2007)}
(A.5)
where Pr(t = 2001|X)i and Pr(t = 2007|X)i are computed for each observation i based
on a probit model for the probability of the sample for the year 2001. Pr(t = 2001) and
Pr(t = 2007) are the unconditional probabilities that the sample is from 2001 or 2007.
A.4 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
This section provides a more detailed explanation of how I apply the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition method to examine how much each of the three factors (proportion of home
health patients, number of episodes per patient, and payment amount per episode) con-
tributed to the total spending increase between 2001 and 2009.
First, I collapse the 2001 and 2009 data to the state level (N=102) and run regression
(A.6) by year.
Y s = β0 + β1X1, s + β2X2, s + β3X3, s + εs (A.6)
where s represents each state. Y ,X1,X2, and X3 refer to Total Spending#MedicareB (home health spend-
ing per beneficiary), #Patients
#MedicareB
(proportion of Medicare beneficiaries utilizing home health
services) , #Episodes
Patient





Second, using coefficient estimates in regression (A.6) and the value of X1 , X2 , and
X3 in 2001 and 2009 (see Table A.1), I decompose the total spending increase between
2001 and 2009 into explained and unexplained components:
Y2009 − Y2001 = {(X1, 2009 −X1, 2001)β1, 2001
+ (X2, 2009 −X2, 2001)β2, 2001
+ (X3, 2009 −X3, 2001)β3, 2001}
+ {(β1, 2009 − β1, 2001)X1, 2009
+ (β2, 2009 − β2, 2001)X2, 2009
+ (β3, 2009 − β3, 2001)X3, 2009
+ (β0, 2009 − β0, 2001) (A.7)
where 2001 and 2009 subscripts are identifiers of years 2001 and 2009. The first three terms
(explained variation) represent the total spending increase per capita due to changes in each
of the three factors, evaluated at the 2001 relationship between total spending per capita and
each of the three factors. The next three terms (unexplained variation) represent the total
spending increase per capita due to changes in the relationship between total spending per
capital and each of the three factors, evaluated at the 2009 value of each of the three factors.
I can also decompose the total spending increase between 2001 and 2009 as follows:
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Y2009 − Y2001 = {(X1, 2009 −X1, 2001)β1, 2009
+ (X2, 2009 −X2, 2001)β2, 2009
+ (X3, 2009 −X3, 2001)β3, 2009}
+ {(β1, 2009 − β1, 2001)X1, 2001
+ (β2, 2009 − β2, 2001)X2, 2001
+ (β3, 2009 − β3, 2001)X3, 2001
+ (β0, 2009 − β0, 2001) (A.8)
where the first three terms (explained variation) represent the total spending increase per
capita due to changes in each of the three factors, evaluated at the 2009 relationship between
total spending per capita and each of the three factors. The next three terms (unexplained
variation) represent the total spending increase per capita due to changes in the relationship
between total spending per capita and each of the three factors, evaluated at the 2001 value
of each of the three factors.
In this decomposition approach, I focus on the explained variation and analyze the
relative contribution of each of the three factors to the total spending increase. When I
decompose using equation (A.7), I find the proportion of home health patients, the number
of episodes per patient, and the payment amount per episode contributed approximately 52
(=.047/.092), 28 (=.026/.092), and 20 (=.019/.092) percent to the total spending increase
between 2001 and 2009, respectively (see Table A.2, column (a)). When I decompose
using equation (A.8), the corresponding contribution percentage of the three factors are
43 (=.053/.123), 31 (=038/.123), and 26 (=.032/.123) percent. In sum, the increase in
the proportion of home health patients contributed the most to the total spending increase
between 2001 and 2009. The number of episodes per patient and the payment amount per




Means and OLS regression coefficients from home health spending per benefi-
ciary regressions for the years 2001 and 2009
(1)Mean (2)Mean (3)Year 2001 (4)Year 2009
in 2001 in 2009 Regression Regression
Coefficient Coefficient
Total Spending per Beneficiary .24 .36
Three Factors
Prop of HH Patients .076 .092 2.85(.097) 3.20(.22)
Episodes per Patient 1.41 1.54 .20(.010) .29(.018)
Payment per Episode 2.17 2.39 .086(.0055) .15(.014)
Constant Term -.44(.017) -.74(.041)
Adj. R-Square .99 .98
Sample Size 102 102
Note: Total spending per beneficiary and payment per episode are in 1,000 dollars.
Table A.2:
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition: Contribution of Each of the Three Factors to
the Total Spending Increase between 2001 and 2009
Using 2001 Coef. Using 2009 Coef.
(a)Explained (b)Unexplained (c)Explained (d)Unexplained
Prop of HH Patients .047(.015) .032(.023) .053(.017) .026(.019)
Episodes per Patient .026(.013) .143(.032) .038(.019) 0.131(.029)
Payment per Episode .019(.005) .148(.036) .032(.009) 0.134(.033)
Constant Term -.295(.044) -0.295(.044)
Total .092(.026) .029(.008) 0.123(.034) -.003(.007)
Note: Explained and Unexplained Variation in columns (a)-(d) are computed based on the
values in columns (1)-(4) of Table A.1. Specifically, Explained in (a)=[(2)-(1)]×(3), Un-
explained in (b)= [(4)-(3)]×(2), Explained in (c)=[(2)-(1)]×(4), and Unexplained in (d)=
[(4)-(3)]×(1).





American Diabetes Association (2006). Diagnosis and classification of diabetes mellitus.
Diabetes Care, 29(suppl 1):s43–s48.
Barrera-Osorio, F., Garcia-Moreno, V., Patrinos, H., & Porta, E. (2011). Using the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition technique to analyze learning outcomes changes over time: An
application to indonesia’s results in PISA mathematics. World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper, No. 5584.
Benjamin, A. (1993). An historical perspective on home care policy. The Millbank Quar-
terly, 71(1):129–166.
Brega, A., Schlenker, R., Hijjazi, K., Neal, S., Belansky, E., & Talkington, S. (2002).
Study of Medicare home health practice variations: final report. Final report, University
of Colorado, Center for Health Policy Research.
Chandra, A. & Staiger, D. (2007). Productivity spillovers in health care: evidence from the
treatment of heart attacks. Journal of Political Economy, 115(1):103–140.
Choi, S. & Davitt, J. (2009). Changes in the Medicare home health care market: the impact
of reimbursement policy. Medical Care, 47(3):302–309.
CMS (2009). Medicare program; home health prospective payment system rate update for
calendar year 2010; final rule. federal register. Federal Register Vol. 74, No. 216.
CMS (2011). Medicare & Medicaid statistical supplement 2011. Technical report.
CMS (2012). Standard analytical files-LDS. www.cms.gov.
Dafny, L. (2005). How do hospitals respond to price changes? American Economic Review,
5:1525–1547.
Dartmouth Atlas (2012). The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. www.dartmouthatlas.org.
Dinardo, J. (2002). Propensity score reweighting and changes in wage distribution.
Dinardo, J., Fortin, N., & Lemieux, T. (1996). Labor market institutions and the distribution
of wages, 1973-1992: A semiparametric approach. Econometrica, 64(5):1001.
Duggan, M. (2000). Hospital ownership and public medical spending. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 115:1525–1547.
109
Ellis, R. & McGuire, T. (1986). Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement: cost
sharing and supply. Journal of Health Economics, 5:129151.
Ellis, R. P. (1998). Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the
intensive and extensive margins. Journal of Health Economics, 17(5):537 – 555,
doi:10.1016/S0167-6296(97)00042-8.
Families USA (1999). The Medicare Buy-In.
FitzGerald, J. D., Mangione, C. M., Boscardin, J., Kominski, G., Hahn, B., & Ettner, S. L.
(2006). Impact of changes in Medicare home health care reimbursement on month-to-
month home health utilization between 1996 and 2001 for a national sample of patients
undergoing orthopedic procedures. Medical Care, 44(9).
Fortin, N., Lemieux, T., & Firpo, S. (2011). Chapter 1 - decomposition methods in eco-
nomics. In Ashenfelter, O. & Card, D., editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, volume
Volume 4, Part A, pages 1–102. Elsevier.
Golberstein, E., Grabowski, D., Langa, K., & Chernew, M. (2009). Effect of Medicare
home health care payment on informal care. Inquiry, 46:58–71.
Grabowski, D. & Hirth, R. (2003). Competitive spillovers across non-profit and for-
profit nursing homes. Journal of Health Economics, 22(1):1 – 22, doi:10.1016/S0167-
6296(02)00093-0.
Grabowski, D. C., Afendulis, C. C., & McGuire, T. G. (2011). Medicare prospective pay-
ment and the volume and intensity of skilled nursing facility services. Journal of Health
Economics, 30(4):675 – 684, doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.014.
HCFA (2000). Medicare program; prospective payment system for home health agencies;
final rule. Federal Register Vol. 65, No. 128.
Henkemeyer, T. (2012). Personal interview.
Horwitz, J. R. & Nichols, A. (2009). Hospital ownership and medical services: Market
mix, spillover effects, and nonprofit objectives. Journal of Health Economics, 28(5):924
– 937, doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.06.008.
King, M., Ruggles, S., Alexander, T., Flood, S., Genadek, K., Schroeder, M., Trampe, B.,
& Vick, R. (2010). Integrated public use microdata series, current population survey:
Version 3.0. [machine-readable database]. Technical report, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis.
Litchman, M. (2010). The impact of a home health medicare policy change on elders
with diabetes in a Utah Endocrinology practice. Poster session presented at the annual
meeting of the Gerontological Society of America, New Orleans, LA.
McKnight, R. (2006). Home care reimbursement, long-term care utilization, and health
outcomes. Journal of Public Economics, 90:293–323.
110
MedPAC (2007). Report to the congress: Medicare payment policy. Technical report,
Washington, D.C.
MedPAC (2010). Report to the congress: Medicare payment policy. Technical report,
Washington, D.C.
MedPAC (2011). Report to the congress: Regional variation in medicare service use. Tech-
nical report.
MedPAC (2012). Report to the congress: Medicare payment policy. Technical report,
Washington, D.C.
Newhouse, J. P. (1970). Toward a theory of nonprofit institution: An economic model of a
hospital. The American Economic Review, 60(1):64–74.
OIG (2009). Medicaid and Medicare home health payments for skilled nursing and home
health aide services. Technical Report OEI-07-06-00641, DHHS, Office of Inspector
General.
Olson, C. A. (1998). A comparison of parametric and semiparametric estimates
of the effect of spousal health insurance coverage on weekly hours worked by
wives. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 13(5):543–565, doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-
1255(1998090)13:5¡543::AID-JAE507¿3.0.CO;2-J.
Sloan, F. A. (2000). Chapter 21 not-for-profit ownership and hospital behavior. volume 1,
Part B of Handbook of Health Economics, pages 1141 – 1174. Elsevier.
111
